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Abstract 
          It is doubtful whether Kripke’s semantical theory alone - or any other version of direct 
reference theory alone - entails strong essentialist claims. In this work, I analyze such claims 
through (i) following Kripke’s argumentation closely, and (ii) using Salmon’s interpretation of how 
we could build Kripke’s perspective without excluding the a priori role from the scheme, (iii) being 
particularly attentive to essentialist claims that involve general terms such as natural kind terms, and 
finally (iv) opposing Fine’s proposal to Salmon’s in order to understand the limitations of a modal 
approach to essence. My goal is to contribute to the debate around the boundaries between semantics 
and metaphysics in the direct reference theory and how to understand scientific discoveries within 
this context. 
Key words: Semantics; rigid designation; essentialism; modality.  
Resumo 
         É questionável se a teoria semântica de Kripke isoladamente considerada - ou qualquer outra 
versão da teoria da referência direta - acarreta fortes alegações/reivindicações metafísicas. Neste 
trabalho, eu analiso tais alegações a partir de (i) acompanhar de perto a argumentação de Kripke, e 
(ii) usar da interpretação de Salmon de como podemos construir a perspectiva kripkeana sem excluir 
o papel do a priori do esquema, (iii) estar particularmente atenta a alegações metafísicas que 
envolvem termos gerais como termos de espécies naturais, e finalmente (iv) opor as propostas de 
Fine e Salmon a fim de entender as limitações de uma aproximação modal à noção de essência. Meu 
objetivo é contribuir para o debate sobre os limites entre semântica e metafísica dentro da teoria da 
referência direta e como entender descobertas científicas dentro deste contexto. 
Palavras-chaves: Semântica; designadores rígidos; essencialismo; modalidade. 
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Introduction 
 On a regular basis, we deal with facts as if they could have been otherwise - at least some of 
them. It sounds pretty accurate to say that I could have had something else for lunch today. 
Nonetheless, some considerations are much more distant from our reality and may be suspected, like 
thinking I could have been born from different parents or that I could have been the actress Meryl 
Streep. I could probably have been an actress (even if I were a bad one), but it is at least dubious 
whether I could have been someone other than myself. Once these considerations are against the 
actual facts that surround us, they became known as counterfactual situations. And the things that 
intuitively could have been otherwise became conceptually understood as contingent facts - i.e., 
things that are possible but not necessarily as they are. 
 The branch of logic concerned with this kind of propositions that involve necessity and 
possibility is known as Modal Logic. But it was not until (KRIPKE 1959, 1962) that the topic 
became the focus of many contemporary logicians and philosophers. Kripke gave new life to the 
interpretation of the modal operators (i.e. necessity and possibility) when he developed a semantics 
for modal logic based on Leibniz’s notion of a possible world. From then on, possible worlds are 
understood as alternative worlds to the actual one, where counterfactual situations happen to be the 
case. A possible world can be understood as the conjunction of all facts that happen to be the case in 
the situation considered - i.e., the notion presupposes that all propositions are either true or false in 
these worlds. This notion could be used to interpret many of the already existent syntactic systems,  1
providing an intuitive way of dealing with counterfactual propositions. 
 Besides Kripke’s developments within formal modal logic, he also uses the notion of 
possible worlds as a tool to highlight features of language. In Naming and Necessity (1980), Kripke 
provided us with an interpretation of possible worlds semantics applied to ordinary language. His 
primary interest was related to proper names and natural kind terms (including also similar 
expressions ). In his so-called Modal Argument, Kripke takes our intuitions about possible worlds to 2
work as evidence of the semantic phenomenon of the behavior of names. He disclaims that the 
designation of a proper name is semantically secured by means of a description that gives the sense 
 In (1959, 1963)  Kripke uses the apparatus in order to prove completeness for a variety of systems.1
 Species names: nouns, mass terms, terms for natural phenomena.2
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of the name. Contra this descriptivist view (of Frege, Russell and others ), Kripke defends the direct 3
reference theory - already raised by Mill (1843). 
But Kripke’s enterprise in Naming and Necessity goes beyond the spectrum of a language 
theory. In fact, the cautious analysis of his arguments shows us that his semantic arguments 
comprise the interpretation of the concepts: a priori and necessary, a posteriori and contingent. 
These notions had been traditionally understood as a block that always come together, in pairs. And 
Kripke challenges this traditional idea by dissociating the concepts. Previously in the history of 
philosophy, Kant had already shaken the standards by identifying judgments with their propositional 
contents and by proposing that there are synthetic a priori judgments. With this proposal, Kant 
opposes the previous modal monism through the claim that there are two irreducibly different basic 
types of necessary truth - the analytic and the synthetic. Even though later on Quine would put in 
check the analytic-synthetic distinction and focus on a new notion of meaning, it was not until 
Kripke that Kant’s view that necessity entails truth (A75–76/B100–101) was challenged. 
In his work, Kripke splits the concepts between metaphysical (necessary and contingent) and 
epistemological ones (a priori, a posteriori). What follows is that Kripke opens up the possibility of 
rejoining these notions in all the four ways available. And, consequently, he opens the possibility of 
the existence of necessary properties of an object to which we access only through experience. So, 
we can say that Kripke’s enterprise involves putting in doubt the standard way of looking up to the a 
priori knowledge, expecting to recognize the meaning of names on it and to search for the essence 
of an object using it as a tool (or maybe as the only tool useful for this purpose). He stands by the 
idea that properties that we use to identify an object - for the reason that we know them a priori - 
and properties that are essential to an object (i.e, necessary) are not one and the same thing (or 
cannot be assumed so without further argumentation on its behalf). 
It is correct to say, then, that in addition to a semantical concern, the agenda of Naming and 
Necessity extends its repercussions to the metaphysical field. That is to say, it also touches the notion 
of essential properties and essence. It does so when it faces the problem of how we are supposed to 
search for these concepts. In such a way that, at first, the boundaries between semantics and 
metaphysics are nebulous in Kripke’s theory. And the reason for that is that beyond standing for the 
possibility of necessary a posteriori truths, Kripke does in fact defend that they do exist and count as 
metaphysical necessities. According to him, the properties of an object or kind that we discover 
 Cluster concept theorists like Wittgenstein3
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through science are fundamental properties of that object or kind - many times they are considered 
to be essential properties of those objects or kinds. But by the time he introduces the topic of 
necessary propositions, he is using possible worlds in his Modal Argument (i.e., an argument in prol 
of his semantics). To this extent, it is not at all clear how Kripke sustains his position. It is our job to 
analyze to what extent Kripke’s metaphysical thesis comes up as a consequence of his semantical 
statements. 
What is more to the point, Putnam and Kaplan - the other main direct reference theorists - 
seem to be committed to the same idea that essential (i.e., necessary) properties of objects and 
natural kinds can be discovered through scientific enquiry. Within direct reference theory, while 
Kripke has made explicit the parallel between proper names’ identities and theoretical identities, 
Putnam elaborated in more detail what it is like to define the meaning of general terms, such as 
natural kind terms and mass terms. And Kaplan was responsible for coining more subtle semantical 
distinctions - distinguishing character from content and developing the semantics of demonstratives 
- that allow us a higher level of understanding of the phenomenon of direct reference as a whole. So, 
our main concern and guide of this research is to analyze the extent to which accepting Kripke’s 
semantic position reflects on metaphysical matters. That is to say, we want to identify what are the 
consequences of direct reference theory semantics to essentialism. Therefore, we focus on the 
analysis of this semantic theory and its implications in order to answer the question: what (if any) 
notion of essence can be derived from direct reference theory alone? 
Opposing the direct reference theorists inclination, there is a branch of contemporary 
philosophers that would reinforce the traditional strength of a priori knowledge into metaphysical 
matters. Two of these philosophers are Salmon and Fine. Both vindicate the importance of a priori 
analysis and offer counterarguments to Kripke’s approach to metaphysics in favor of necessary a 
posteriori propositions. And, not by coincidence, both attack such approach by denying that any 
substantial metaphysical thesis could be derived from semantics alone. On Salmon’s account, there 
is a general mechanism used to generate such necessary a posteriori truths. The room for the a 
priori knowledge is left for the statement that it is through philosophical analysis that we can know 
which statement is necessarily true, if true at all,  of the object (of kind K). Hence, Salmon sustains 4
his position in assessing that there is a premise implicit in Kripke’s theory (which the latter would 
admit), namely: in any particular case, there is a (essential) property whose role is to serve as a 
sufficient condition to identify the object in counterfactual situations (i.e., the establishment of 
 KRIPKE, 1980, p.109.4
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transworld identities of an object). Nevertheless, while arguing for such thesis, the similarity 
between common nouns (such as natural kind terms) and proper names is taken for granted. Soames 
(2002) highlights that fact. And together with him, we will evaluate some difficulties of such a 
presupposition. 
On his turn, Fine advocates the a priori philosophical analysis of the object in order to state 
its essential properties just like Salmon does. However, Fine’s approach grounds the modal notions - 
and, therefore, the necessary properties of the object - on the definitional notion of an object (or 
kind). So, Fine argues against Kripke’s view by holding that the notion of essence is not well 
understood if considered strictly in modal terms. Both Salmon and Fine disagree that the essence can 
be unveiled a posteriori. The upshot to both of them is an advocacy of an a priori philosophical 
analysis of objects and a conception of metaphysics that denies that its questions can be genuinely 
answered by another field of knowledge. Both hold that metaphysical assertions only arise from 
given metaphysical premises, making it impossible for such assertions to be mere consequence of 
semantic tools. Thus, a second moment of this research is the evaluation of the arguments that 
Salmon and Fine formulate against the reductionist interpretation of the kripkean theory - that 
reduces metaphysical questions to a matter of semantics and more often than not to responses given 
by science. 
To sum up, the tie between the modal notions of necessity and contingency, the mechanism 
of reference and the ontological issues is a controversial one. We seek to understand, within the 
scope of the aforementioned authors, the role that the intention would come to fulfill in our approach 
to metaphysical questions and to what extent the intuitive content may work as evidence of 
metaphysical truths. Our starting point is the reconstruction of Kripke’s (semantic and metaphysical) 
arguments in favor of his theory. Followed by the analysis of the criticisms made by Salmon, 
Soames and Fine to the kripkean essentialism, in order to clarify the consequences of adhering to 
direct reference semantic project. The analysis of their criticisms allow us to better evaluate the 
feasibility and consequences of the kripkean project. 
Hence, this research’s main concern is methodological above all. My objective can be 
generalized in terms of considering which could be the more promising approach to the subject of 
essence and essential properties within the scope of direct reference theory. This big picture involves 
questions like (i) the possibility of reducing our metaphysical intuitions about the objects to the 
elements of our language structure, (ii) the role of the analyses of counterfactual situations to clarify 
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the object’s behavior in the actual world, as well as (iii) the role of a priori philosophical analysis on 
the matter of deciding between essential and contingent properties of an object. More specifically, 
on the first and second chapters, we explain the core concepts of direct reference theory and to what 
extent they are used to cross the boundaries of a semantic theory and develop metaphysical thesis. In 
the third chapter, we focus on the general mechanism used to compare identities between names, 
assertions of essential properties of an object and theoretical identifications that direct reference 
theorist use in order to justify scientific discoveries as providing us with essential properties of 
objects and kinds. The forth chapter is dedicated specially to the nature of natural kind terms. And, 
the fifth chapter contains an analysis of Fine’s proposal and the extent to which his criticisms affect 
the direct reference theorist’s view on metaphysical matters. Working within the scope of the 
previous authors, we expect as a result to contribute to the debate around the boundaries between 
semantics and metaphysics in direct reference theory and the role of science in the field of 
metaphysics. 
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Chapter 1 
Direct Reference Theory Semantics 
 The boundaries between semantics and metaphysics are, at first, nebulous in Kripke’s theory 
and so it is in Putnam’s theory as well. The reason for that is that they both borrow a semantic notion 
in order to sustain their metaphysical thesis. That is to say, they take into consideration the notion of 
rigid designator - coined by Kripke - when explaining which would be the essential properties of an 
object or kind. The task that they take up is to develop a theory in which identity statements between 
names as well as theoretical identifications and assertions of essential properties of an object are 
necessary – in case they are true, of course. While Putnam discusses theoretical identifications 
straightforwardly, it seems that Kripke’s strategy is to develop a direct reference theory of names in 
order to explain essential properties and theoretical identities, while paralleling them with the 
identity between names. On both approaches, those theoretical statements can be interpreted as the 
result of an identity relation between two terms rigidly designating only one object (or kind). 
 The question that remains is whether we can attest that the parallels seen by Kripke are 
plausible and well sustained by the arguments he provides us with. It is up to us to verify whether 
the behavior of theoretical identities and identities between an object and its individual essence are 
in accordance with the behavior of identities between proper names. If it is attested, the theory of 
reference and the uncontroversial claim of self-identity might, by themselves, be enough to equate 
the aforementioned propositions, and their pattern of behavior. If it is not attested, it is up to us to 
analyze (at least some) alternatives that could provide us with an explanation of the rigidity of such 
terms involved in theoretical identities. For the purpose of answering these questions, this first 
chapter will work on highlighting focal points of the direct reference theory they advocate, relying 
also on some key concepts by Kaplan - a third big name and developer of the Direct Reference 
Theory. 
Thought Experiments 
The proposal of direct reference theory - both Kripke and Putnam’s versions - is first and 
foremost to challenge descriptivism. The descriptivists stand for the idea of names as equivalent to 
definite descriptions (expressions like “the x such that Fx”, such as, “the author of Nicomachean 
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Ethics”).  So, they defend a theory in which the referent of a name is the only object that satisfies 5
the description (in the aforementioned example, it would be Aristotle). Hence, the descriptivists 
would agree about the existence of a purely qualitative content responsible for linking names and 
their respective referents - working as a mediator between them. The established equivalence 
between names and descriptions leads them to understand these two classes of singular terms as 
synonymous and interchangeable in the analysis of the sentence.  In order to challenge their 6
approach and disprove the synonymy between names and definite descriptions, Kripke presents his 
(called by the literature as) Modal Argument and Putnam presents his Twin Earth Experiment. Their 
strategy is, to some extent, the same: to take into account counterfactual situations when we are 
analyzing the truth conditions of a sentence. 
The Modal Argument 
Kripke’s Lectures, presented in Naming and Necessity, have become widely known, mostly 
because of the (as it is now called) Modal Argument. Kripke’s modal argument is one of the three  7
arguments against the descriptivist theory that Kripke developed on his Lectures. On this argument 
Kripke points to the fact that when we say “Aristotle might not have been the author of Organon” 
we do not contradict ourselves. This sentence would be a contradiction if the name Aristotle were 
synonymous with the description “the author of the Organon”, but it is not. Aristotle might not have 
done what is attributed to him in the actual world.  For example, in a possible world the author of 8
the Organon could have been Plato instead of Aristotle. In Kripke’s own words, “most of the things 
commonly attributed to Aristotle are things that Aristotle might not have done at all. In a situation in 
which he didn’t do them, we would describe that as a situation in which Aristotle didn't do them”.  9
That is to say, Aristotle could have failed to do not only one of the things that we attribute to him, 
but many (maybe all) of them. Thus, not only each of the attributes, but the cluster of all of them 
together would be a contingent fact about Aristotle (i.e., things that could have been otherwise).  10
 Syncategorematic expressions which can not be asserted as true or false alone, they only present an individual.5
 For the descriptivists the assertion that an object exists has as its propositional content that a certain description or 6
property is satisfied by one and only one x. For example, to assert that Aristotle exists is to say that there is one and only 
man who is the author of Nicomachean ethics, or the writer of Organon (or whichever description he chooses, as long as 
it is attributed solely to him).
 They are: the modal argument, the semantical argument and the epistemical one.7
 KRIPKE, 1971, p.40.8
 KRIPKE, 1980, p.61.9
 KRIPKE, 1980, p.62.10
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Kripke relies on the intuitive content  of cases like this in order to highlight the semantic 11
phenomenon that names and definite descriptions present distinct behaviors when we incorporate 
counterfactual situations into the truth conditions of sentences. According to Kripke, we intuitively 
agree that another person might have been the author of the Organon, but no one besides Aristotle 
could have been Aristotle himself. The reason for that is that it is possible to imagine at least one 
counterfactual situation, a possible world, in which the referent of the name remains the same 
although it is not associated to that same description - as it is in the actual world. While the 
description may describe people other than Aristotle in different possible worlds, the name refers to 
Aristotle no matter which possible world we are considering. From this thought experiment, we are 
able to attest that the name “Aristotle” and the description “the author of the Organon” are only 
materially equivalent and cannot be synonymous due to their distinct behaviors in the counterfactual 
situations considered.  12
This argument that Kripke uses against the equivalence between descriptions and names is 
known as his Modal Argument. It is through the distinction of modes of truth, contingent and 
necessary - verifiable through possible worlds - that Kripke shows that descriptions in general (with 
the exception of those containing essential properties) are contingent upon their referents while 
names are always bound with the same object. Opposed to the definite descriptions, the names 
behave in such a way that they stick to the object to which the speaker wants to refer to. 
Twin Earth Experiment 
 On the other hand, Putnam proposes another thought experiment. In this experiment, instead 
of talking about counterfactual situations through talking about how things could have been, he 
stipulates a Twin Earth. He presupposes, by hypothesis, that there could have been a world that is 
pretty much like Earth - the Twin Earth - in which everything is exactly like it is on Earth. The only 
exception is that the content of lakes and oceans, what falls from the sky when it rains and so on is 
not H2O but XYZ.  The XYZ is indistinguishable from water at normal temperatures and pressure 13
and is everywhere on Twin Earth that water is on our world. That is such that if a spaceship from 
Earth visited Twin Earth, the Earthian would report back to Earth that, on first sight, apparently there 
is water on Twin Earth. Nevertheless, after taking a sample of t-water and figuring out that it is 
“I think it [intuitive content] is very conclusive evidence in favor of anything, myself.” KRIPKE, 1980, p.42.11
 KRIPKE, 1980, p.31.12
 For a discussion about the problem raised by distinguishing to be/ to be constituted by see JOHNSTON, 1997. 13
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actually XYZ, the Earthian would report that that which did seem to be water is actually XYZ and 
not water. 
 This thought experiment shows us that our intuitions are that something else might look like 
water and therefore have the same descriptions attributed to it (being a colorless, tasteless, thirst 
quenching etc) although nothing but water can be H2O. More to the point, if we suppose the Twin-
Earthians to speak English (like on Earth) with the only distinction that what they call ‘water’ the 
content of lakes and oceans, what falls from the sky when it rains and so on, the Earthian would 
report “On Twin Earth the word ‘water’ means XYZ”. In this scenario, our intuitions favors the 
interpretation that what have happened when comparing Earth and Twin Earth was a shift of 
meaning of the word ‘water’ and not a mere change of one of water’s contingent characteristics. On 
Twin Earth, if what fills the lakes and oceans and falls from the sky when it rains was pink instead 
of colorless - but it still was H2O - the intuition raised would be that water would have the same 
meaning on both worlds even though they had a distinct characteristic. 
 Additionally, Putnam suggests we roll the time back to 1750. By then, the Earthian did not 
know that water was two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen. Even though it would take their 
scientific community about fifty years to discover that they and the Twin-Earthians understood the 
term ‘water’ differently, “yet the extension of the term ‘water’ was just as much H2O on Earth in 
1750 as in 1950; and the extension of the term ‘water’ was just as much XYZ on Twin Earth in 1750 
as in 1950.”  In other words, in 1750, we could say there was no belief the Earthian had about water 14
that the Twin-Earthian did not have about t-water. But even though they were in the same 
psychological state, the object of their beliefs were different even then.  Putnam’s point is that “the 15
extension of the term ‘water’ (and, in fact, its “meaning” in the intuitive preanalytical usage of that 
term) is not a function of the psychological state of the speaker by itself”.  And, for that reason, the 16
psychological state alone does not determine the extension of the word.  17
 This argument that Putnam uses against the equivalence between psychological states and 
meaning is known as his argument for the semantic externalism. It is a direct criticism of the 
descriptivist view since for them the meaning of a term is a concept (i.e., mental entities) responsible 
for determining the extension of the terms - in the sense that sameness of intension entails sameness 
of extension. 
 PUTNAM, 1973b, p.702.14
 “the same phenomena happens on our world alone when a language user does not know how to distinguish an elm 15
from a beech tree, associating the same descriptive content to both of them, and even then being able to refer to them 
separately and successfully”. PUTNAM, 1973b, p.704. 
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Rigid Designator 
 We should keep in mind that, when considering these counterfactual situations and 
describing possible worlds, “we use English with our meanings and our references”.  That is to say, 18
it does not matter how people in the possible world considered would call a particular or describe it. 
Of course language might have been used differently but that is not the focus here. The sense in 
which a name stands for a specific thing is when we talk about counterfactual situations, we talk 
about the same object no matter the counterfactual situation considered. To this extent, proper names 
always designate the same object, in all counterfactual situations in which that object exists. The 
term “Aristotle” is just a name for this man.  The term “water” is just a name for this kind. And in 19
Kripke’s words, this is the question of rigidity: “we can ask whether what is expressed would be true 
of a counterfactual situation if and only if some fixed individual has the appropriate property”.  20
Therefore, names are rigid designators.  21
 Indeed, when analyzing the truth conditions of “Aristotle might not have been the author of 
the Organon” our intuitions seem aligned with the rigidity theory. No proof that some person other 
than Aristotle might have been the author of the Organon is relevant to the truth of the quoted 
statement. Apparently, the same intuition is raised when dealing with terms like ‘water’. No proof 
that some substance other than water could be composed by hydrogen and oxygen is relevant to the 
truth of the statement “Water is H2O”. Generally speaking, “we have a direct intuition of the rigidity 
of names, exhibited in our understanding of the truth conditions of particular sentences”.  And our 22
intuition concerning names opposes to that of non-essentialist definite descriptions. As seen before, 
definite descriptions tend to maintain a loose link with the object they refer to. The only object that 
satisfies the descriptive conditions might change in different counterfactual situations. That is the 
reason why Kripke ascribes them as non-rigid designators.  Consequently, “we do not then make 23
the name synonymous with the description, but instead we use the name rigidly to refer to the object 
 KRIPKE, 1980, p.77.18
 KRIPKE, 1980, p.41.19
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 “The thesis that names are rigid in simple sentences is, however, equivalent to the thesis that if a modal operator 21
governs a simple sentence containing a name, the two readings with large and small scopes are equivalent. This is not 
the same as the doctrine that natural language has a convention that only the large scope reading is allowed. In fact, the 
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For further discussion on this matter, see DUMMETT, 1973.
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so named, even in talking about counterfactual situations where the thing named would not satisfy 
the description in question”.  24
Direct Reference 
So, names and definite descriptions are not considered synonymous by either Kripke or 
Putnam. And, for that reason, those terms are not interchangeable in the analysis of sentences - the 
description does not provide the meaning of a name. That is to say, definite descriptions do not 
contribute to the propositional content of a sentence that contains the name of the object that 
uniquely satisfies it. Moreover, not only Kripke does put in check the supposed synonymy, he also: 
(i) separates the notion of giving a meaning from that of fixing the reference of a term (the so-called 
Semantical Argument); and (ii) points out that, even with this distinction of senses in which we can 
define a name, there is no guarantee that descriptions necessarily play a role in it either way (the so-
called Epistemical Argument). And these statements lead Kripke to sustain that there is some 
independent criterion for reference of the name. Bolstered by Kaplan’s notions of character and 
content - developed to account for his theory of indexicals - the next step of direct reference theory 
is to convey that the propositional content of names is exhausted by its referents. 
Semantical Argument 
According to Kripke, the descriptivists’ mistake is twofold: (i) they would advocate that 
definite descriptions give the definition of names in the sense of giving its meaning; (ii) they 
understand the notion of defining a name as univocal. Once Kripke shows us with his Modal 
Argument that names and definite descriptions behave differently in counterfactual situations, he 
rules out (i). But there are two senses in which a description can define a name. Aside from this 
stronger version of definition - that requires the synonymy between the singular terms -, there is a 
sense in which the definition is only responsible for fixing the reference of the name. In this second 
sense of definition “even if its reference is in some sense determined by the description, statements 
containing the name can not in general be analyzed by substituting the name for the description, 
although they are materially equivalent to statements containing the description”.  To that extent, 25
the description is used only to select, in the actual world, which is the referent of the name. Then, 
 KRIPKE, 1980, p.156.24
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the definition (i.e., the description) would be able to detach itself from that object in counterfactual 
situations. Such a condition is created by its role, once it is limited to how we are able to identify (in 
the actual world) the object to which the name refers to.  26
So, if we analyze the definition of a name in the sense of fixing its reference, we can 
recognize some examples of descriptions that play a role in the definition of names in this way. A 
paradigmatic case is initial baptisms, such as the stipulation of a meter as the length of the stick S in 
Paris at time t0.  The name “meter” strictly designates a certain abstract measure in all possible 27
worlds. This measure happens to be the length of S in t0 in the actual world. But the stick could have 
another length at t0, it could be larger or smaller due to different temperature conditions in t0. It is 
okay to have the description as the definition of meter because when we are only concerned with 
identifying an object, we do not need to take into account the counterfactual situations. In such a 
case, the only thing that matters is the (material) correspondence of the reference of the terms in the 
actual world. In Kripke’s words: “There is a certain length that he wants to highlight. It is 
highlighted through a contingent property, namely that there is a stick with that length”.  28
Epistemological Argument 
 Notwithstanding, even in the sense of fixing the reference of a name, there is no guarantee 
that definite descriptions play a role in the definition of all names. Kripke points that there are cases 
in which the speaker is not able to assert an uniquely satisfying description to a name (ex. when 
someone solely knows about Feynman that he is a physicist). There are also cases in which the 
speaker does attach a definite description to a name but in a way that his or her knowledge keeps 
being circular (ex. when someone fixes the reference of Einstein as the author of the Theory of 
Relativity and she goes backwards fixing the reference of the Theory of Relativity as the theory 
developed by Einstein). And there are even cases where the speaker uses a description to refer to an 
object without noticing that the description expresses a false belief about the object (as Donnellan  29
points it out in his example of the guy drinking a Martini at a bar - who is actually drinking water). 
 Kripke’s concern is that “we should distinguish the present intention of using a name for an 
object from the mere present belief that the object is the only one to have a certain property, and 
 KRIPKE, 1980, p.57.26
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 KRIPKE, 1971, p.55.28
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clarify this distinction”.  What Kripke intends to show us is that this diversity of ways of fixing the 30
reference shows that in attributing a description to a name, we might have already had the reference 
of that name fixed. In other words, a competent user of a name does not need to be in possession of 
any non-trivial identifying description of the referent of that name. Consequently, it is plausible to 
consider that we might have a way to refer independently of the descriptions we associate with the 
name and stand by the idea of the direct reference of names.  31
Character and Content 
 Kaplan distinguishes between two levels of meaning of a word, they are the character and the 
content. Generally speaking, character is the rule of usage of an expression within a language and 
content is that which is determined by the character in a particular context. The terms in which this 
distinction becomes more evident are the indexicals. Among indexical terms there are the pure 
indexicals such as “today”, “now”, “here”, “I” and demonstratives such as “this” and “that”. The 
communality among these terms is that “the referent is dependent on the context of use and that the 
meaning of the word provides a rule which determines the referent in terms of certain aspects of the 
context” . In other words, the linguistic rules which govern the use of the indexicals are not 32
sufficient to determine their referent in all contexts of use - we must evaluate its referent according 
to the context considered. For instance, the rules that apply to the usage of “I” are that it designates 
whoever is the one to utter the word in a sentence. And its referent might change according to the 
context of the utterance - if who uses the word changes so does the referent of the word. 
 So, due to this nuanced distinction, Kaplan highlights the importance of also “distinguishing 
possible occasions of use (i.e., context) from possible circumstances of evaluation of what was 
stated in a context”.  That being said, propositions are taken to be what is said in a given context. 33
Accordingly, be it that the indexical constituent depends exclusively on the context (i.e., it is a pure 
indexical) or that it also relies on an associated demonstration (i.e., it is a demonstrative), it  is taken 
to be directly referential.  The reason for that is that directly referential terms may designate 34
different objects when used in different contexts. But given a context of evaluation, only a single 
 KRIPKE, 1980, p.163.30
 “None of us will get started with any attribution unless there is some independent criterion for the reference of the name 31
other than ‘the man to whom the incompleteness of arithmetic is commonly attributed’.” (KRIPKE, 1980, p.89).
 KAPLAN, 1989, p.490.32
 KAPLAN, 1989, p.494.33
 “I intend to use ‘directly referential’ for an expression whose referent, once determined, is taken as fixed for all possible 34
circumstances, i.e., is taken as being the propositional component”. (KAPLAN, 1989, p.493). See also the principles on 
KAPLAN, 1989, pp.492-3.
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object will be relevant no matter the circumstances considered. On Kaplan’s words, “the intuitive 
idea is not that of an expression which turns out to designate the same object in all possible 
circumstances, but an expression whose semantical rules provide directly that the referent in all 
possible circumstances is fixed to be the actual referent”.  35
 Names, from singular proper names to natural kinds terms, seem to share this trait too. It 
seems like they could have named something distinct in another possible world but once the context 
is determined and their reference fixed, they will designate that object(s) rigidly. Contra Kripke, 
Kaplan says that they are rigid designator not because we figured out through thought experiments 
that they turned out to designate the same object. But the opposite is true, they designate rigidly 
because the semantical rules related to names provide that in all possible circumstances the content 
will be the same once the referent is fixed. According to Kaplan, that is the general characteristic of 
rigid designators and what distinguishes names from definite descriptions: “the designatum 
(referent) determines the propositional component rather than the propositional component, along 
with a circumstance, determining the designatum [as it happens to definite descripritions]” .  36 37
Partial Remarks 
Non-Transparency of Identity Sentences 
 The reason why we may have the false impression that identity statements between names 
are contingent (possible, but not necessary) is the way in which we fix the reference of the object or 
class of objects, i.e., with a non-essential description. The point is that “even if our knowledge 
seems to help to determine the referent of a name, usually the content of our knowledge is only 
contingently related to the object we refer to”.  We might have used the two terms as names of two 38
different objects. We may not know in advance that those two definite descriptions apply to the same 
object in the actual world. Of course, if one or both of the terms connected by an identity statement 
is not a rigid designator, we cannot rush to the conclusion that the truth value of such statement is 
necessary. Nevertheless, once the reference of the names is fixed, the identity of the object with 
 KAPLAN, 1989, p.492.35
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itself is maintained in all the possible worlds. Even though the identity between the descriptions 
used to fix the reference is contingent, the objects designated by these designators will be 
necessarily identical and the necessity also applies to the identity between its names. 
 A case in point is “Hesperus is Phosphorus”. Both Hesperus and Phosphorus were 
discovered to be the planet Venus. But even before that, people would call them by their names 
identifying each one by a description “Hesperus is the evening star” and “Phosphorus is the morning 
star”. At first, nobody knew they were one and the same planet. And it is possible to imagine a 
counterfactual situation in which there would be another celestial body positioned in that same 
location in space either in the evening or in the morning. So, under such circumstances, we would 
not have called Hesperus “Hesperus” because Hesperus would have been in a different position. But 
this has nothing to do with the necessity of identity . That would still not make Phosphorus 39
different from Hesperus.  That is to say, we could be qualitatively in the same epistemic situation 40
that we are, relative to two different objects instead of one. The initial epistemic conditions often do 
not allow us to conclude which of the alternatives is to be the case, but it does not follow that what is 
the case is not necessarily the case.  41
Necessary a posteriori 
 The sense in which one could say that things could have happened in different ways - a.k.a. 
in such a way they would not be identical - is merely epistemic , because of the lack of evidence. In 42
advance of empirical research, one only knows that “Hesperus is Phosphorus if and only if one and 
the same body occupies position x in the evening and position y in the morning. The a priori 
material equivalence of the two statements, however, does not imply their strict (necessary) 
equivalence”.  Leaving epistemological questions aside, an empirical investigation is required to 43
state the antecedent (the identity x=y) of the conditional known a priori. Settling the antecedent 
 KRIPKE, 1980, p.156.39
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according to evidence, we can conclude by modus ponens the necessity of the identity as an a 
posteriori truth.  44
 The point is that linguistic competence might not provide us with enough information to 
foresee whether a sentence is metaphysically necessary. Provided that speakers respect the rules of 
language usage,  they are able to use a name without yet a transparent access to the semantical 45
content of the name. For instance, before scientific enquiry, the community of speakers were aware 
neither of the truth or of the necessity of “Hesperus is Phosphorus”. As Kaplan attests, “we get 
extreme cases in which linguistic competence is simply insufficient to completely determine the 
content of what is said”.  46
 KRIPKE, 1971, p.153.44
 Rules like: “(C) A proposition p is semantically expressed by s only if p is included in the information a competent 45
speaker would assert and intend to convey by an assertive utterance of s in any normal context, in which s is used 
nonmetaphorically, without irony or sarcasm, and so on, with its literal meaning by conversational participants who 
understand s.” (SOAMES, 2002, p.57).
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Chapter 2 
Crossing the Boarder: Metaphysical Implications 
Boundary Lines 
 Direct reference theorists’ apparatus elaborated to deal with language goes beyond that. 
Besides providing them with arguments in favor of the direct reference theory, the tools manage to 
reach epistemical and metaphysical matters. That is so because their interpretation of language 
intents to be neutral towards epistemical and metaphysical theorizing and in order to do so they end 
up drawing new lines between these philosophical inquiries. Nonetheless, once their attempt is 
boosted by the semantical theory, we should take a closer look at it. By doing so, we expect to better 
understand (i) to what extent what Kripke defends is directly and exclusively derived from his 
semantical apparatus and (ii) what these new boundaries between the fields may bring as 
consequence for our understanding of each one of them separately - specially in respect to 
metaphysical assumptions.  
Metaphysical vs. Epistemological Concepts 
The distinction between identifying properties and necessary properties of an object 
underlies both Kripke’s and Putnam’s semantical outlook. The applicability of this distinction comes 
with the consequence of a split of the notion of a priori from that of necessity. On one hand, a priori 
and a posteriori are concerned with the epistemological issue. On the other hand, necessity and 
contingency are metaphysical concepts. Or, as Kripke would say, “one of them has something to do 
with knowledge, of what can be known in certain ways about the actual world. The other one has to 
do with metaphysics, how the world could have been; given that it is the way it is, could it have been 
otherwise, in certain ways?”.  If something can be known to be true of the actual world, 47
independently of all experience, it is known a priori; and a posteriori otherwise. And a fact about 
the world is necessary if beyond being true, it could not have been otherwise; while contingency 
 KRIPKE, 1980, p.150.47
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deals with possibilities that are not mutually exclusive - i.e., being in a way is not enough to state it 
could not have been the other way around.  48
The point is that being from two different domains of philosophy, these concepts do not 
come together, and all the four combinations among them are possible - that is easily recognizable 
either in cases of initial baptism or with identity statements between names. According to this 
framework, the question about the criteria to identify an object and the question about what 
properties are necessary to an object are not equivalent, and may have different answers . The direct 49
reference theory involves on its enterprise putting in doubt the standard way of dealing with the a 
priori knowledge, expecting to recognize the meaning of names on it and to search for the essence 
of an object using it as a tool (or maybe as the only tool useful for this purpose). According to it, the 
search for identity criteria is often related to identifying the object and, thereof, an epistemological 
concern. That is to say, it leads us to the question of epistemic access to the referent of a name and it 
can be replied by means of contingent descriptions of the object as long as we access them a priori. 
Additionally, Kripke argues that the identification is not necessary to the analysis of 
counterfactual situations. And the reason for that is that we are the ones to stipulate the possible 
worlds. In Kripke’s own words, “a possible world is given by the descriptive conditions we associate 
with it”.  Hence, possible worlds are not presented as something that is given to us, something 50
before which we will be mere observers - as it is tempting to think while looking at Putnam’s Twin 
Earth Experiment. On the contrary, we can make its rules and ask whether that world is possible. To 
this extent, the questions involving, on one hand, identity criteria and, on the other, whether it is 
possible for a particular to have a specific property are not the same topic of discussion. The first 
question requires a purely qualitative description of the individual. While in the second scenario the 
individual has been fixed before we can verify some properties it might have. Within this viewpoint, 
then, the question of transworld identity is actually an epistemological question of having criteria to 
keep track of a particular in all the counterfactual situations. And, on the other hand, the question 
about whether a particular could not have been otherwise is a metaphysical question concerning the 
object itself - it is a question about the nature of the object independently of our ability to recognize 
it. 
 KRIPKE, 1971, pp.34-39.48
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Formal Features 
For sure, Kripke’s theory has some essentialist import. When he decides to frame his account 
of reference in modal terms, he is aware of “the trivial fact that all quantified modal logics are 
essentialist”.  They are essentialist in the sense that modal operators can apply to open sentences. 51
That is to say, if necessity is used as a semantical predicate of names of statements and statements 
themselves, it is also applicable to sentences in general (open and closed alike). He does elaborate a 
common mathematical structure (pure semantics)  in order to state that essential predication makes 52
sense, “i.e. whether, □Fx ought to be well-formed as an open sentence” . Arriving to the conclusion 53
that “if analyticity is well defined, so is quantified modal logic” . And the denial of this conclusion 54
is the same as the denial of a mathematical result . Along with this defense, comes the acceptance 55
of the validity of self identity.  56
Furthermore, Kripke’s account makes some not trivial essentialist claims. When Kripke 
employs the Modal Argument, he relies on the falsity of hyperessentialism (i.e., that all properties of 
an object are essential to it). That is to say, he relies on the notion of contingent property in order to 
stand for the meaningfulness of the notion of essential property.  So, that argument presupposes that 57
not all properties of an object are essential to it and excludes one possible essentialist approach 
beforehand. As a result, we can state that Kripke’s direct reference theory works on drawing some 
boundary lines to the topic of essentialism, even if we concede that it is controversial whether 
Kripke manages to state moderate essentialism principles having his philosophy of language as the 
only tool (aside from trivial and uncontroversial claims). 
 KRIPKE, 1961, p.4.51
 “But, if we are dealing with a single system of modal logic, all these alternative interpretations, giving different types of 52
applied semantics, will nevertheless yield semantical notions having a common mathematical structure [pure 
semantics]” (KRIPKE, 1961, p.2).
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 “I only claim that I have given one method of setting up quantified modal logic; and that this method requires only the 54
existence of a semantical predicate satisfying (12)-(13). Does this show that essentialism is after all not involved in 
quantified modal logic, that essentialism can be defined in terms of analyticity, or that analyticity involves as bad a 
metaphysics as essentialism? The option is unreal. In this paper, we have shown the following simple fact: If analyticity is 
well defined, so is quantified modal logic” (KRIPKE, 1961, p. 6).
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 “Self-identity, for example, is surely a necessary property of every object: if we are permitted at all to apply necessity to 56
an open sentence, surely (x) □(x=x) is true. But if p is any contingent statement, x=x & p will be true, but contingently true; 
and hence x has “accidental” , as well as essential properties.” (KRIPKE, 1961, p.4).
 “The example I gave asserts a certain property - electoral victory - to be accidental to Nixon, independently of how he 57
is described. Of course, if the notion of accidental property is meaningful, the notion of essential property must be 
meaningful also. This is not to say that there are any essential properties - though, in fact, I think there are.” (KRIPKE, 
1980, p.41). See also HUGUES, 2006, p.110.
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Haecceitism in Possible Worlds Semantics 
 The direct reference theory shows that an individual may be an immediate element of a 
sentence due to a name’s behavior in natural language. That is to say, the theory is opened to the 
possibility of the existence of singular propositions. Taking this into consideration, Kripke defends 
the thesis that there is no need for purely qualitative descriptions of possible worlds. If we are 
willing to look at the behavior of a specific object, Kripke’s account of proper names permits that we 
ask about the object without there being a purely qualitative set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for being that object. In other words, it does not demand that we restate the question in 
terms of such conditions.  That is, we first determine if F and G are the same object, so we decide 58
whether or not F has a property that G has. In this type of approach, no criteria is provided for the 
identification of an object, since questions of epistemic character (e.g., how do we know that this 
would indeed be Nixon in the proposed counterfactual situation?) cease to make sense. 
 Additionally, given Kripke’s concern with the principle of the indiscernibility of the 
identicals and his reassertion of it in the metalanguage, he would retain identity as an intrinsic notion 
of the object. That reinforces the idea that the identity of an object does not require a definition in 
terms of other concepts involved in the analysis. Once possible worlds are “given by the descriptive 
conditions we associate with it”  and names are not disguised or abbreviated (non-rigid) 59
descriptions, there is no obvious motivation for the reference of a name to be questioned according 
to the choice of a possible world. In Kripke’s words, “who is to prevent us from saying “Nixon 
might have gotten Carswell through had he done certain things”? We are speaking of Nixon and 
asking what, in certain counterfactual situations, would have been true of him”.  60
 In other words, despite our epistemic concerns, the identity of an object is taken as a 
primitive concept. Then, according to Kaplan’s terminology,  Kripke stands for a haecceitist 61
position. Haecceitism consists on taking as a basic fact that the identity of an object in the actual 
world is kept intact when considering other possible worlds. That is such that an intraworld identity 
is also always a transworld identity . Accordingly, in Kripke’s work, we can recognize Kaplan’s 62
statement that “the acceptance of singular propositions is linked to the acceptance of transworld 
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identities”.  The reason why transworld identities can be taken just as primitive as the identity 63
within a possible world is that possible worlds would not share times or places, would not be 
causally connected. A possible world would be understood as “the totality of facts in that world” - in 
the sense that it would assign at least one truth-value to every statement and at most one.  To that 64
extent, the actual world “- better, the actual state, or history of the world - should not be confused 
with the enormous scattered object that surrounds us”.  In other words, possible worlds are not 65
material objects that should be taken as “a distant country”. Hence, there is no reason why an object 
could not exist in different worlds in this sense (i.e., it would not be a case of one and the same thing 
being in two different places spatio-temporally connected).  66
 Nevertheless, it is important to notice that Kripke’s intent is not to advocate that possible 
worlds should be specified in terms of particulars and not qualities. Kripke’s point is that possible 
worlds can be stated either way, and there seems to be no less objection on stipulating that we are 
speaking of certain people than there can be objection to stipulating that we are speaking of certain 
qualities. According to Kripke, what might be a question is whether the world stipulated is possible. 
In other words, the question is - after we have stipulated a world the way that most suits us - whether 
the particulars could have been the way we stipulate them to be (i.e., if there is such a possibility or 
there are some metaphysical constrains related to the nature of the objects considered). According to 
Kripke, the first step is to recognize the reference of a name, and only after that we are able to work 
with possible worlds and then recognize what is necessary and what is contingent to the object. That 
is the mechanism Kripke uses so that “we can consider these questions about necessary conditions 
without going into any question about sufficient conditions” . 67
 We should be careful when we construct logical models to represent possible worlds, “we 
must distinguish those features of the model which represent features of that which we model, from 
those features which are intrinsic to the model and play no representational role [the artifacts of the 
model]”.  The haecceitist position takes an individual itself - as opposed to an individual-under-a-68
concept - to be an immediate constituent of a proposition.  Hence, this position takes the fact that 69
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individuals can be extended in logical space as representing features of the metaphysical reality 
instead of regarding it as an artifact of the model. Describing a possible world in terms of 
individuals provides us with the advantage of accessing the propositional content of a sentence 
independently of the circumstances. That is to say, “the propositional component need not choose its 
designatum from those offered by a passing circumstance; it has already secured its designatum 
before the encounter with the circumstance”.  70
Metaphysical Matters 
According to the stablished distinction between the concepts of epistemic and metaphysical 
nature, what we grasp a priori about an object does not have to correspond to those necessary 
properties an object has. And this distinction works as the starting point of Kripke’s defense that 
“one may very well discover the essence empirically”.  Both Kripke and Putnam advocate that the 71
properties one may discover through science are the ones that provide us with basic structural traits 
that correspond to the nature of the object analyzed. In their interpretation it is possible to imagine 
the most varied counterfactual situations, but it is not possible to imagine that something has a 
distinct nature from that which it possesses in the actual world (it is possible to imagine. Although 
the worlds themselves are not possible)  - and science would be able to evidence this nature of 72
things.  First, we will analyse Kripke’s defense through a parallel with identities between proper 73
names. And later we will add Putnam to the discussion due to his more detailed treatment of natural 
kinds within the context of the direct reference theory. 
Essential Properties 
With the challenge of the notion of the necessary a priori, Kripke stands by the existence of 
a different kind of necessity, namely: necessary a posteriori propositions. According to Kripke, “the 
notion of essential properties can be maintained only by distinguishing between the notions of a 
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priori and necessary truth”.  Essential properties are understood by Kripke as properties that are 74
true of the object in any case where it would have existed,  in such a way that these properties are 75
considered necessary to the object. Nevertheless, its necessity does not rely on logical matters but on 
metaphysics. As Murcho states, “to defend that there are necessary truths that are not logical truths is 
precisely what characterizes the essentialism” . 76
Additionally, with Kripke’s defense of identities between names as necessary, he reinforces 
the idea of necessary a posteriori propositions not only as possible but as an effective 
exemplification of these propositions.  Such propositions, then, upgrade their status from possible 77
to actually existent. As Kripke states it, the necessity of identities between names is distinct from the 
necessity of mathematical truths. While the truth of mathematical propositions is guaranteed by 
logical truth - and, for that reason, necessary -, the truth of identities between names has no such 
guarantee. That is to say, it is logically possible that the objects involved in the proposition were 
otherwise. What sustains their necessary status is that it is metaphysically impossible that an object 
was distinct from itself.  78
Essence of Particulars 
On footnote 56 of Naming and Necessity (1980), Kripke develops a sort of a proof that 
supposedly justifies the necessary link a table has with its original constituent matter. In particular, 
according to him, the content of the proof should be enough to support a principle such as “if a 
material object has its origin from a certain hunk of matter, it could not have had its origin in any 
other matter”.  According to Kripke, this should work like a proof of necessary properties of an 79
object. Using a parallel explanation to that of identities between names he intends to avoid any 
further metaphysical committing premisses on his argument. 
According to Kripke, once we know that this table was carved from a piece of wood H, 
whatever we imagine counterfactually having happened to this table, one thing we cannot imagine 
happening to it is that it could be made right from the start from a different matter and it would still 
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exist as the same object. We should keep in mind the fact that a table that is made of ice but that 
causes in us the same sensory evidence that I in fact have of the actual table may exist. And if it 
does, we would be qualitatively in the same epistemic situation as we are, but if that other table was 
made of ice it should not concern us. Leaving this epistemic issues aside and focusing on the 
metaphysical question, there is an intuition “that anything coming from a different origin would not 
be this object”.  The question is whether the way in which we would describe such a situation is 80
enough to justify this intuition. Kripke seems to give it an affirmative answer, and he draws the lines 
of the argument as follows: 
Let ‘B’ be a name (rigid designator) of a table, let ‘A’ name the piece of 
wood from which it actually came. Let ‘C’ name another piece of wood. 
Then suppose B were made from A, as in the actual world, but also another 
table D were simultaneously made from C. (We assume that there is no 
relation between A and C which makes the possibility of making a table 
from one dependent on the possibility of making a table from the other.) 
Now in this situation B ≠ D; hence, even if D were made by itself, and no 
table were made from A, D would not be B. Strictly speaking, the ‘proof’ 
uses the necessity of distinctness, not of identity.  81
So, according to this passage, Kripke’s strategy is to presuppose the creation of another table in 
order to distinguish A and C. He would explain the material distinction through the distinction of the 
two tables correspondently associated with their matter - all of which are rigidly designated. Kripke 
then avoids giving reasons why table A could not be constituted by hunk C.  In Ballarin’s words, 82
“they would attempt to show the necessity of origin by finding reasons to rule out any alternative 
possible origin, rather than arguing for such a necessity directly”.  Kripke intents to parallel the 83
cases and extend this reasoning to molecular constitution of chemical elements, to the propagule’s 
DNA of a person, to natural kinds and their biological taxonomy etc. He claims that this is a “proof’ 
of the general Principle of Origin. 
Scientific Discoveries 
Another step on Kripke’s strategy is to advocate that theoretical identities as well as 
statements concerning essential properties of an individual and identities between names are all 
necessary a posteriori propositions. Always having our intuitions on counterfactual situations as a 
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background, Kripke aims to extend the applicability of the conditional “if P, then necessarily P”. 
According to him, we can agree that though we might not know a priori what the essential property 
of an object is, it is necessarily as it is. In other words, despite not knowing the essential property of 
an object or kind, we know in advance that whatever it is must necessarily be the case (according to 
his own understanding of what an essencial property is).  For example, relative to the essence of a 84
particular individual. A DNA test was taken and it was confirmed that Elizabeth was really the 
daughter of her royal parents and not adopted by them. Whatever we imagine counterfactually 
having happened to her, the one thing we cannot imagine is that she could have had other parents 
(and DNA). She could have taken the DNA test and it could bring the result that Mr and Ms. Truman 
were her parents in the actual world. But that is related to the epistemic conditions previous to the 
test, it asserts that given the qualitative conditions we initially had, we could not predict the results 
of the test. 
Kripke’s point is that “the type of property identity used in science seems to be associated 
with necessity, not with a prioricity, or analyticity”.  And his reasoning relies on examples to 85
persuade us. Well, when we are considering properties we access through scientific discoveries, we 
can agree that it is an empirical matter whether something is the case. For example, it is only after 
some research that scientists realized that tigers are mammals. But, once it is stated, if we find out 
some individuals with the same external marks by which we originally identify tigers that are not 
mammals - e.g. they are aliens - we would not say they are tigers. We might say that they look like 
tigers. Something else we could say is that tigers could have been aliens right from the beginning 
and we are the ones that did not realize that beforehand.  This condition is not originated by the fact 86
that, once we make a scientific discovery, the old concept of tiger is replaced by the new scientific 
definition.  On the contrary, that is something connected to the concept of tiger before the internal 87
structure of tigers has been investigated. In Kripke’s words, “even though we don’t know the 
internal structure of tigers, we suppose - and let us suppose that we are right - that tigers form a 
certain species or natural kind” . Even if this notion of a kind we keep in mind is a vague  one, it is 88 89
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enough for us to be able to imagine that there could be “a creature which, though having all the 
external appearance of tigers, differs from them internally enough that we should say that it is not 
the same kind of thing”.  90
And the same line of reasoning applies to other sorts of things (e.g. mass terms), as “Gold 
has the atomic number 79” or “Water is H2O”.  The point is: our intuition is that whether we talk 91
about tigers, gold or water, in any counterfactual situation of which we would say these things 
existed at all, we would also keep these properties attached to their referents. Kripke’s explanations 
of the examples contribute to the understanding of theoretical identities and statements concerning 
essential properties of an individual as, generally, identities involving two rigid designators.  And, 92
therefore, they are also examples of the necessary a posteriori. So, according to the view Kripke 
advocates, such “general names” (i.e., species names: nouns, mass terms, terms for natural 
phenomena) behave the same way as proper names do.  That is to say, the possession of most of the 93
identifying properties “need not be a necessary condition for membership in the kind, nor need it be 
a sufficient condition”.  What underlies this assumption is the same idea of the Semantical 94
Argument: we should bear in mind the contrast between the contingent properties we knew a priori 
and used to fix the reference of a term and the properties that are necessary to it (i.e., that constitutes 
its meaning).  95
Additionally, the terms (or phrases) that refer to essential properties work just as names do, 
as rigid designators too. Kripke’s train of thought - along with his thought experiments - show us 
that the discovered properties contrast with the initial identifying marks because they single out the 
object or kind in a much better way than the initial marks could. The reason for it is that the object 
or kind, once analyzed on its basis - of what the substance is - has that basic structural traits if and 
only if it is the object or kind it is (taking the “if and only if” as strictly as we can, so as necessary). 
The original concept of a kind brings with it the notion of that kind of thing  even if it is a vague 96
notion. Nevertheless, “whether a given kind is a species of animals is a matter for empirical 
investigation”.  But this shows nothing against the view that scientific investigation is necessary. 97
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Partial Remarks 
An Attempt to be Neutral 
 According to the descriptivists, definite descriptions would be synonymous with names. 
Thus, the objects would be identified in possible worlds through its properties. And these properties 
would be necessary and sufficient conditions to identify the object. Under the interpretation of 
essential properties as the necessary properties of an object, the descriptivists could be understood as 
advocating that identifying properties would be the same as the essential properties of an object. 
Kripke’s attempt is to show that this framework leads us to the misleading belief that the 
metaphysical and the epistemological issues come together and that everything we can know about 
an object a priori would be a necessary property of that object - and that any necessary property of 
an object would rise from an a priori knowledge. The tricky feature of this kind of descriptivist view 
is its approach to the object. It would invoke a concept of object that seems inseparable from its 
properties. Consequently, every time we speak about someone having a property, we are actually 
talking about properties that come together (the bundle of properties idea) instead of speaking of 
individuals. In other words, since there are no singular propositions, every time we refer to an object 
we are pointing to a bundle of properties.  The reason for that is that in this view the meaning of 98
words are always understood as concepts - therefore, descriptional content. 
 Opposite to this view we find Kripke and the direct reference theory. His theory of names 
provides a way of referring to the object without taking into consideration any specific 
correspondence between the name of the object and a description. It opens the door to a neutral way 
of dealing with metaphysical issues and yet asking metaphysical questions. It also opens the 
possibility of splitting the properties of the object and analyzing them individually. As a defender of 
intuition, Kripke highlights “it is very far from being true that this idea [that a property can be held 
to be essential or accidental to an object independently of its description] is a notion which has no 
intuitive content” . And Kripke integrates this intuition to his theory when interpreting theoretical 99
identities and statements of essential properties as identities between two rigid designators - just like 
identities between names. As Murcho states it, “the thesis of rigid designation is metaphysically 
 This comment is made having in mind theories such as Russell’s (1905) in which singular propositions are very rare (if 98
not non existent) and the consequence is that most of the propositions that talk about individuals rely on definite 
descriptions, a.k.a. properties, to denote objects.
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neutral” . That is so because a competent speaker is able to articulate the language even if she does 100
not have a previous access to what might be the essential properties of an object. 
 Throughout Naming and Necessity, Kripke seeks to remind us that “the belief hardly ever 
constitutes a priori knowledge”.  Additionally, he advocates that such fact is not a difficulty for the 101
speaker. Once the objects can be part of the propositional content of a statement, she has direct 
access to it through language and may talk about these things even though she does not know some 
unique property satisfied by these objects. For example, in Kripke’s words, “I think you do know 
who Cicero is if you just can answer that he’s a famous Roman orator” . That is so because, 102
respecting the direct reference theory, Kripke defends that objects would not be reducible to a cluster 
of properties. As he states, “if a quality is an abstract object, a bundle of qualities is an object of an 
even higher degree of abstraction, not a particular”.  103
 Both thought experiments - Kripke’s and Putnam’s alike - are used to state a semantical 
externalism. That is to say, both arguments work against the view of reducing a word’s reference to a 
content in the mind of the speaker (represented by the usual definite descriptions attributed to the 
object referred). Instead, those arguments show us that there must be a external component - 
external to the language - which we are referring to and which cannot be reduced to a cluster of 
properties. As a consequence, “to have linguistic competence in connection with a term it is not 
sufficient, in general, to have the full battery of usual linguistic knowledge and skills; one must, in 
addition, be in the right sort of relationship to certain distinguished situations (normally, though not 
necessarily, situations in which the referent of the term is present)”.  In other words, in the direct 104
reference theory, linguistic competence is distinguished from having access to relevant knowledge 
of the object. Once inserted in a language community we can apprehend and use a name to 
communicate without having transparent epistemic access to its propositional content.  105
 MURCHO, 2002, p.66. Thank you to Prof. Marco Ruffino for highlighting that this quote should be understood in terms 100
of the thesis of rigid designation not being allied to a specific and strong metaphysical thesis, although in the weaker 
sense the rigidity thesis does bring a metaphysical import to the extent that it would exclude the possibility of objects 
being reduced to a cluster of properties.
 KRIPKE, 1980, p.87.101
 KRIPKE, 1980, p.83.102
 KRIPKE, 1980, p.53.103
 PUTNAM, 1973a, p.202.104
 So there is room within the picture of direct reference theory to error and unawareness of the truth value of identity 105
propositions.
 41
Consequence of Stressing the Thought Experiments 
 Kripke’s approach to possible worlds semantics - when it is stressed to a point in which we 
can grasp its ultimate consequences - presents us with some extreme cases. One example is a plant 
and its seed.  Considering that the plant died before developing its stem and blooming above the 106
earth, plant and seed would share all its material properties in the actual world. The only way we 
could distinguish them would be through their dispositional or modal properties. Hence, Kripke 
would argue that material objects can be distinct (in the actual world) in virtue of having distinct 
properties in counterfactual situations. That is to say, we rely on other possible worlds in order to 
state how probable or improbable the actual outcome is and also as a source to the distinction of two 
objects - the plant and its seed - that might have had the same outcome only in the actual world. 
 This kind of extreme case may prompt us to the intuition that these dispositional differences 
could be grounded in something like a categorical distinction  or something like that - e.g., in 107
terms of grounding for the transworld identities. This idea leads us to considering at least some 
extrinsic properties as essential to the objects in addition to the intrinsic ones. That is so because it 
contains the notion of a thing being of a certain sort and different from another. To that extent, 
identities would not be strictly an internal relation - the view to which Kripke commits himself 
explicitly. 
Restrictions of a Haecceitist Position Allied to Actualism 
 Kripke does not a criteria for intraworld identity of an object. Despite that fact, Kripke 
manages to go from conditional metaphysical claims of the form "if it is possible that p, then 
necessary that p" to state the necessity of p - e.g., from “if it is possible that water is H2O, then it is 
necessary that water is H2O”, Kripke advocates that “it is necessary that water is H2O”. The reason 
for this is his approach to the notion of possible worlds. Namely, Kripke is an actualist. And, 
therefore, he understands that the actual world has a distinct characteristic comparing to the other 
possible worlds: the set of individuals existing in each possible world is subordinated to the set of 
individuals that exist in the actual world - i.e., it is always a subset of this set. In other words, 
everything that exists (even if contingently) in the other possible worlds exists in the actual world.  108
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Consequently, possibility is reduced to necessity, since we know the conditional, and we add to it 
that “possible p” iff we find p in the actual world. Therefore, "necessary that p”. 
 His actualist sympathy can also be recognized in other moments of Kripke’s theory. For 
example, in his argument about non-existent objects (KRIPKE, 2013). According to Kripke, 
qualitative information about fictional objects or merely possible objects is not sufficient to identify 
such objects in a described counterfactual situation. Even if we find an object with qualities identical 
to the descriptions we associate with the fictional name, we can not conclude that there are objects 
corresponding to these names. It would be necessary, first, to have the reference fixed and the 
identity established. But this is not possible since, in the actual world, the objects corresponding to 
the fictional names do not exist. Therefore, we would not know under what circumstances they 
would have existed. 
 His approach excludes merely possible objects,  i.e. non actual ones, thereby it also 109
restricts the rules of how to conceive a counterfactual situation - as well as the intuitions raised by it. 
Strictly speaking, as sketched here, Kripke’s theory is capable of deriving only the fact that 
compossibilities (i.e., objects which exist simultaneously in the actual world) do not interfere with 
one another in counterfactual situations. So, it only restates the characterization of identity as 
intrinsic and not susceptible to external interferences. 
 There are two ways of arguing for the transition from something possible (i.e., something 
which is the case) to the acknowledgment that this is something necessary: (i) adding a relevant 
metaphysical premise or (ii) restricting the possible worlds semantics. Kripke adopts the second 
option. And by doing so, instead of explaining, he excludes a good deal of our intuitions. The 
question that remains is: Is it worth paying for the high cost of sustaining such an interpretation in 
order to avoid essentialist premises? We do not see what the advantages of avoiding a priori 
metaphysical premises would be, once they have to be compensated stating a deflated notion of what 
a possible world is. 
 MAKIE (2009, p.96) characterizes Kripke’s use of possible worlds as a ‘branching model’ in which the way things 109
might have been different is restricted to divergences from the actual world.
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Chapter 3 
A General Mechanism 
 Analyzing Kripke’s and Putnam’s examples of theoretical identities and essential property 
attributions, Salmon comes up with a general mechanism used to generate such necessary a 
posteriori truths. We would need the assumption of an ostensive definition or a descriptive 
operational definition of the term plus two premises: (i) the fact that the object has a determined 
structure (be its atoms, or the DNA etc); (ii) the fact that being the very same individual (of kind K) 
as something consists in having the property “the same structure x”.  Therefore, what follows as 110
the conclusion of such an argument would be a proposition of the form “it is necessarily the case 
that: the object (or kind), if it exists, is x. On Kripke’s account of the second premise, he leaves 
room for the a priori knowledge when he states that it is through philosophical analysis that we can 
know which statement is necessarily true if true at all  of the object (of kind K). In this chapter, 111
with the help of Salmon’s interpretation (2005), we will analyze the proposed general mechanism 
and emphasize the role of a priori philosophical analysis within the direct reference theory. 
Rigid Designation and the First Assumption 
 The first assumption is a product of the direct reference theory. Nevertheless, as Salmon 
notices, what follows from their reliability on the rigidity of the terms - names and terms for 
essential properties - is that we need two rigid designators to do the trick, but it may not necessarily 
come from the direct reference theory. All that is required is that the “definition” of the term 
correctly fixes its semantical intension in accordance with a metaphysical intension. And there are 
multiple ways of fixing a rigid designator to the relevant object. One way of doing so without 
relying on the direct reference theory is to use the sentential actuality operator , that would be 112
enough to fix the reference of the term across possible worlds. When we attach the actuality operator 
to any definite description, we keep track of the same object no matter what possible world is 
considered because we are always referring to the object that satisfies that description in the actual 
world. Hence, from what has been said, we conclude that the key point of the first assumption is for 
 SALMON, 2005, p.161.110
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the chosen designator to be rigid. In other words, the designator must have some sort of ostensive 
definition which picks out the intensions of a term and keeps track of the same object or kind 
whichever possible world has been considered. Salmon’s point is that Kripke’s direct reference 
theory would be just one particular case concerning rigidity. 
So, Salmon (2005) disclaims that essential assertions could be a mere consequence of 
semantical matters. He notices that Kripke’s and Putnam’s essentialist arguments rely on the rigidity 
of terms - i.e., rigidity of both names and terms for essential properties. And what follows from this 
reliability is that we need two rigid designators to do the trick, but they may not necessarily come 
from the direct reference theory. Whenever we find (i) a description that is uniquely satisfied by an 
object or kind and (ii) that is a description of a property of the object that we could find a posteriori, 
we can have a necessary a posteriori proposition - and, consequently, state an essential property. The 
aforementioned strategy would suit any kind of philosophy of language (even a Fregean orthodox 
one) . As a consequence, this leaves the metaphysical claims lacking an independent motivation. 113
Otherwise, without the development of metaphysical constraints, “the theory of direct reference 
seems to be perfectly compatible with nontrivial essentialism concerning chemical substances, and 
also with its negation”.  114
The Two Premises 
 One of the premises is a piece of empirically verified information. It is the recognition, after 
looking at the actual world, of an object or kind having some property x. That piece of information 
has the form of a definite description that we could find a posteriori (for example, a paradigmatic 
sample having the chemical structure XYZ). It could be basically any a posteriori truth if it was not 
for the additional premise that states that piece of information as a description of the “hidden nature” 
of the paradigm referred to in the ostensive definition.  The second premise is the one to carry the 115
weight of the essentialist import, it states that being the very same individual (of kind K) as 
something consists, at least in part, in having a certain property. 
 What is the status of the other premise? Does it rely on some feature of the direct reference 
theory or else in some uncontroversial claim like the self-identity? Both when we are dealing with a 
single object and its essential properties and when it comes to natural kinds and what makes two 
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samples to be of the same kind, it is a truth of logic the intra-world principle that in any possible 
world, identical objects (of a certain kind) are made of the same matter or have the same structure. 
For example, in any possible world, identical tables are originally constructed from the very same 
matter; or yet, within an arbitrary possible world two samples of water must share the same 
chemical structure within that world. These intra-world truths are instances of Leibniz’s Law, or the 
Indiscernibility of Identicals.  But what is needed in the second premise is a cross-world condition 116
for an object to be itself and no other and for two samples being of one and the same kind. The 
second premise requires a principle that asserts, at a minimum, a necessary condition on the cross-
world same-K relation. 
 On Putnam’s (1962, 1973b) as well as Donnellan’s (1973, 1974) interpretations they 
understand the second premise as “the product of scientific discovery, of scientific theories or, 
perhaps, change in scientific outlook” . Such an idea leaves small room for understanding the 117
premise as anything but an a posteriori truth. Through scientific discoveries, we would have access 
to the nature of the objects. On the other hand, Kripke leaves room for the a priori knowledge when 
he states that it is through philosophical analysis that we can know which statement is necessarily 
true if true at all.  Or yet, we could understand such propositions on Casullo’s terminology: “the 118
existence of essential properties would entail that there are necessary propositions whose truth value 
and specific modal status are knowable only a posteriori, but it would not entail that there are 
necessary propositions whose general modal status is knowable only a posteriori”.  That is to say - 119
being the general status the necessity or contingency of a proposition and its specific modal status its 
truth or falsity - Kripke would claim that the truth of such an essential proposition is knowable only 
a posteriori but even before the acknowledgment of its truth value we know whether it is necessary 
(and also essential) a priori. 
 The role of the a priori analysis is shown when Kripke (or anyone else) constrains his 
considerations about essence to the theoretical properties and some particular qualities. For example, 
“being constituted by H2O” and “being the most abundant liquid in our world are both” are both 
definite descriptions that designate facts uniquely satisfied by the kind water, but only the first one is 
taken as an essential property of water. It would not follow only from the empirical inquiry of how 
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things are in the actual world that the propositions of scientific content (such as “water is H2O”, 
“Gold has atomic number 79”, “cat is mammal”) would be necessary truths. Salmon argues that 
empirical investigation can base knowledge only of what is the case, but not of what is necessarily 
the case. For him, the last premise is a purely metaphysical premise, and it is this premise that 
determines which properties should be considered essential.  120
Metaphysical Premise 
 For Salmon, the assumption that there is a structure that determines what it is like to be an 
individual (or a member of a natural kind) is not enough. It is a conditio sine qua non to clarify what 
this structure is, not only in the actual world but in all possible worlds. So, the premise P → □P in 
accordance with the argument in favor of the scientific discoveries as essential properties would 
have some hidden essentialist import. They must have, in order to justify their rigidity. The 
additional purely metaphysical clause would be what underlies a theory in defense of what 
corresponds to “to be of the same class (or species) consists of”, or what corresponds to “what being 
a specific object consists of”. According to him, without such clause, there is no way to ascertain 
that the semantical intension of a term coincides with a metaphysical intension of a certain 
substance. Even using the mechanism to create a posteriori truths, the theory would not be able to 
avoid some kind of metaphysical commitment independent of the direct reference theory. 
 The notions of ‘consists in’ and ‘being consubstantial with’ are vague, but they seem to 
suggest some notion of a necessary and sufficient condition for an object to be what it is and for two 
samples being of the same kind. So, Salmon can be interpreted as standing for the idea of a 
commitment to the definition of an inner structure of objects that would play the role of a necessary 
and sufficient condition for that object to be what it is in intraworld and transworld scenarios. 
Actually, Salmon’s analysis of Kripke’s essentialist theses is that Kripke wants the conclusion of the 
argument to be that there are some essential properties of objects and kinds and for that reason the 
notions of ‘consists in’ and ‘being consubstantial with’ cannot presuppose the necessity he wants to 
state. Hence, the option Kripke has left is that in order to justify a property as necessary, by 
philosophical analysis we must have concluded that such property is a sufficient condition to be the 
object or kind (in intra and transworld situations). In other words, Kripke needs to state that if 
 SALMON, 2005, p.164.120
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something is possibly the case, then that is necessarily the case when it comes to essential properties 
of an object or kind. 
Simply put, it would not follow only from the empirical enquiry of how things are in the 
actual world that the propositions of scientific content (such as water is H2O, Gold has atomic 
number 79, cat is mammal) would be necessary truths. Salmon argues that empirical investigation 
can base knowledge only of what is the case, but not of what is necessarily the case. For him, there 
is a metaphysical premise that was omitted in Kripke’s argument, and it is this premise that 
determines which properties should be considered essential. Salmon maintains that without the 
stipulation of which property an object must keep in all possible worlds, the other premises of the 
kripkean argument do not support its conclusion. So, Salmon can be interpreted as standing for the 
idea of a commitment to the definition of an inner structure of objects that would play the role of a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the recognition of that object in intraworld and transworld 
scenarios. And the reason for that is that Salmon expects this essential property to justify the identity 
of the object through the possible worlds. Hence, Salmon’s characterization is: in order to justify a 
property as necessary, by philosophical analysis we must have concluded that is a sufficient property 
to recognize the object or kind (in intra and transworld situations) . 121
Sufficiency 
Analyzing Salmon’s interpretation on a particular case can clarify his proposal. For instance, 
his reconstruction of the proof on footnote 56 of Naming and Necessity (1980), where Kripke 
develops a sort of a proof that supposedly justifies the necessary link that a table has with its original 
constituent matter. According to Salmon, Kripke cannot derive any essentialist conclusion like the 
one intended from his premises. At least not by just counting on the Indiscernibility of Identicals and 
logical and philosophical premises that do not somehow have already an essentialist import. As 
Salmon points out, what we can strictly state from the argument sketched as Kripke does is that an 
object cannot be made from possible coexisting hunks of matter unless they are overlapped.  So, in 122
order to reach the intended general principle, Salmon suggests the following reconstruction of the 
proof: 
P1: For any table x and any hunks of matter y and y’, if it is possible for a 
table x to be originally constructed entirely from hunk y while hunk y’ does 
 To deeper discussion on the matter see SALMON (1979) and also next section in this dissertation.121
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not overlap with hunk y, then it is also possible for table x to be originally 
constructed entirely from hunk y while some other table x’ distinct from x is 
simultaneously originally constructed entirely from hunk y’.  123
P2: If it is possible for a table x to originate from a hunk of matter y, then 
necessarily, any table originating from hunk y is the very table x and no 
other.  124
As we can see from this passage, to reach the intended conclusion we need an extra premise, besides 
the addition of a non-overlapping requirement.  Salmon highlights the fact that x’ being made of y’ 125
in a possible world does not answer whether x can be made out of y’ in spite of being actually 
originated from y. Hence, to exclude this kind of possibility that would break the necessary link 
between an object and its origin, he proposes (P2). This presupposition is, of course, an essentialist 
claim that Salmon believes to be needed as an additional premise in Kripke’s proof. In his 
interpretation, “Kripke’s argument uses origin as a (necessarily) sufficient condition for being this 
very table in order to prove that origin is also a (necessarily) necessary condition”.  That is to say, 126
Salmon maintains that without the stipulation of which property an object must keep in all possible 
worlds, the other premises of the kripkean argument do not support its conclusion.  127
According to him, the same happens when it comes to identities composed by general terms: 
there is a metaphysical premise that was omitted in Kripke’s argument, and it is this premise that 
determines which properties should be considered essential. As Donnellan points out , before 128
essential statements can be made about natural kinds there is a previous question we have to address 
concerning natural kind terms and that is: to be stated as a kind they must overcome the 
paradigmatic sample by means of an intraworld relation of being an instance of the same K which is 
a theoretical relation. If a nondescriptional general term applies to some things but not others, then 
there must be something that the individuals in its extension have in common. So there must be 
something in virtue of which the term applies to them but not anything else - a way of justifying its 
application - even though the term is nondescriptinal.  129
 SALMON, 1979, p.708123
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 “non overlapping hunks of matter, in the sense they can have no parts in common throughout their existence.” 125
SALMON, 1979, p.708.
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 One should not overlook the fact that Kripke’s proof would be a proof not of a general essentialist principle but of a 127
principle applying exclusively to tables, taken one at a time. And, aside from this proof itself, that takes the length of a 
note (56) in his book (1980), Kripke only introduces the topic of general principles by saying that they are suggested by 
reflection on particular examples. I think that this might be the source of Salmon’s concern when he says: “the new theory 
of reference, insofar as it is a theory of closed expressions (proper names, natural-kind terms, indexicals, perhaps 
referentially used definite descriptions, etc.) and not a theory of free individual variables, is entirely inessential to Kripke’s 
argument [in favor of general principles]” (SALMON, 1979, p.721, fn8.)
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 SALMON, 2005, p.164.129
 49
Following Donnellan’s lead, Salmon maintains that without the stipulation of which property 
an object must keep - in order to belong to a kind - in all possible worlds, the other premises of the 
kripkean argument do not support its conclusion. As he points out: 
[T]he ostensive definition of water taken together with the fact that the 
paradigm sample has the chemical structure H2O do not by themselves 
yield the conclusion that it is necessary that water is H2O, without relying 
on the additional information that being consubstantial with something 
consists in having the same chemical composition.  130
 And the answer to the consubstantiality would come from a sufficient condition for two objects to 
be of the same kind. Therefore, even though these terms are understood as nondescriptional, such 
condition would play the role of identifying those objects and maintaining the same behavior of 
those kinds’ names. In other words, natural kind terms and mass nouns would work as labels of 
kinds and the definite descriptions found out by science would work as sufficient condition of 
identity of these same kinds - since they translate what being of the same kind K means. 
An apparent mismatch 
 Salmon would advise us to approach the subject of essentialism by asking about intraworld 
relations. His central concern is to be able to define what "consubstantiality" would consist of - e.g., 
when it comes to species, what it means to belong to a particular species. However, at first glance it 
is difficult to understand how this search for identity within the actual world would fit into Kripke's 
project. For Kripke, identity is a primitive notion and the relations between an object and its 
essential properties are not relations of identity. 
 Salmon’s thesis is that the theoretical relation that determines what to be an instance of a 
kind is would suggest a necessary and sufficient condition for two samples being consubstantial . 131
And, even further, this determinacy is an intraworld relation that must become a transworld relation 
- it determines how things are and not how they must be - but this transition must be justified. The 
metaphysical premise would contribute to define whether there is anything underneath the 
theoretical relation that explains why it would be a sufficient condition to consubstantiality and why 
there is such a thing as a sufficiency condition to being the object (of a kind K) that it is. 
 Because in Kripke’s theory the object does not equate to a set of properties, it also would not 
equate to the more restricted set of its essential properties.  In the light of that, Salmon’s 132
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suggestion might seem inadequate since it interprets Kripke as proposing a sufficient condition for 
the identity of an object - in descriptive terms. Notwithstanding that acknowledgment, the 
haecceitism is not incompatible with Salmon’s proposal. The key for understanding that is the notion 
of supervenience. Generally speaking, supervenience is understood as a binary relation between 
properties (or sets of them) and such a relation can be defined as “there can be no ‘variation in’ the 
supervenient properties without some ‘variation in’ the subvenient properties” . In other words, 133
taking two non-empty sets of properties A and B, the set of properties A supervenes upon set B just 
in case no two things can differ with respect to A-properties without also differing with respect to 
their B-properties. 
 In the specific case of direct reference theory, we could say that the identity of an object - 
even though it is a primitive concept - supervenes on that object’s essential properties. And the 
reason for that is that a change on the set of essential properties of an object (or as Salmon wants it, 
a change on the sufficient properties for an object to be what it is) would lead to a change on its 
identity as all. For instance, in the table-case, identity supervenes on what matter the table is made 
from. Therefore, on direct reference theory, the fact that theorists do not take identity to be reducible 
to a set of (essential) properties does not mean that the identity of the object and its properties are 
not modally connected. 
Partial Remarks 
A Disanalogy 
 The sense in which one could say that things could have happened in different ways is 
merely epistemic , because of the lack of evidence. In advance of empirical research, one only 134
knows that “Hesperus is Phosphorus if and only if one and the same body occupies position x in the 
evening and position y in the morning. The a priori material equivalence of the two statements, 
however, does not imply their strict (necessary) equivalence” . Leaving epistemological questions 135
aside, an empirical investigation is required to state the antecedent (the identity 
Hesperus=Phosphorus) of the conditional known a priori. Settling the antecedent according to 
evidence, we can conclude by modus ponens the necessity of the identity as an a posteriori truth.  136
 CORREIA, 2008, p.1028.133
 “the ‘might’ here is purely ‘epistemic’ - it merely expresses our present state of ignorance, or uncertainty.” (KRIPKE, 134
1980, p.103)
 KRIPKE, 1971, p.154, note 14.135
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Since in this case the essentialist premise is self-identity - a truth of logic - it may be omitted entirely 
as a premise of the argument. And we would generate a necessary yet apparently a posteriori truth 
from the direct reference theory without relying on any special essentialist premise. Having fixed the 
reference of the names and discovered by scientific inquiry that both heavenly bodies are the same 
planet will do to state the necessary a posteriori truth.  137
 That is not exactly paralleled by the propositions that relate an object to its individual 
essence. As we saw above, the relations between an object and its essential properties are not 
relations of identity in Kripke’s theory. For that reason, the second premise of the mechanism cannot 
be simply an instance of the self-identity principle. Instead, we have to rely on a metaphysical 
principle independently motivated in such a way that a priori philosophical analysis does not 
depend strictly on truths of logic. The a priori philosophical analysis that we have to go through in 
such cases is deeply metaphysical and controversial. That being said, these cases still lead to a 
conclusion that is a posteriori to the extent that we still need the scientific discovery to attest the 
antecedent of the metaphysical premise and to be able to derive its consequent. 
 The propositions that relate a kind to its essential properties work in a similar fashion. These 
cases also lead to a conclusion that is a posteriori due to relying on scientific discoveries to be 
stated. Nonetheless, it is the a priori philosophical analysis that justifies those as the essential 
properties of the kinds being deeply metaphysical - and controversial.  So, even using the 138
mechanism to create a posteriori truths, the theory would not be able to avoid some kind of 
metaphysical commitment independent of the direct reference theory since without the a priori 
clause there is no way to ascertain that the semantical intension of a term coincides with a 
metaphysical intension of a certain substance. That is such that despite the similarities the natural 
kind term (as well as mass terms) involve additional difficulties. Essential statements concerning 
sets of objects have yet an evident additional step to be considered. As Donnellan points out , to be 139
stated as a kind they must overcome the paradigmatic sample by means of an intraworld relation of 
being an instance of the same K which is a theoretical relation. 
 SALMON, 2005, p.192, note 8.137
 “the sentence ‘Water is H2O’. This sentence is different in character from the identity statements involving individuals 138
given above in that, while the term ‘H2O’ designates the substance water - or perhaps more accurately pure water - it 
seems to be descriptional relative not to (pure) water but to the component substances hydrogen and oxygen (“the 
compound whose chemical composition is two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen”). The statement involving water is 
thus less like ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ and more like ‘Hesperus is the second planet from the sun’.” (SALMON, 2005, p.
81)
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Remaining Constraint 
 It is worth mentioning that understanding the necessary properties of an object or kind as a 
sufficient condition of the object or kind to be what it is is not without its difficulties. For example, 
knowing that two animals are mammals is not enough to assert that they are both cats, or that two 
identical twins are the same person for sharing the same genetic code. Forbes (1986) raises a 
counterargument himself when considering that “scientists could surely synthesize cells - perhaps 
half a dozen or so - that [all] fuse to produce the atom-for-atom replica of z as it actually is, which is 
again a situation in which s and e do not exist” . Being z a human zygote that is formed by the 140
fusion of a sperm s and and egg e in the actual world, Forbes considers a possible world in which the 
metaphysical principle of Origin Essentialism  is challenged - at least our intuitions are that we 141
could consider Forbes’ possible world as a metaphysical possibility. 
 Salmon does acknowledge the strength of the table version of the principle of Origin 
Essentialism that relies on the sufficiency premise that states that “if it is possible that a table x’ is 
originally constructed from z, then necessarily, any table originally constructed from z is the very 
table x’ and no other”. It’s easy to agree with the compossibility premise that says that no table has 
distinct non overlapping origins in a single possible world but we are inclined to think that different 
tables could have been made from the same piece of wood. And that inclination challenges the 
sufficiency of original material matter for an object - in this case, a table - to be what it is. Salmon is 
aware of that and in order to make it more appealing to our intuitions, he offers a weaker version of 
the premise that would include the builder, his planning and the table aesthetics: “if it is possible that 
a table x’ is originally constructed from z according to a certain plan P, then necessarily, any table 
that is originally constructed from z according to P is the very table x’ and no other”.  142
 Nevertheless, as Robertson (1998) points out, Salmon’s provision is not enough to avoid all 
the trouble involving such a sufficiency premise. Even if we take into account a still weaker version 
of the premise, as “if it is possible that a table x’ is the only table originally constructed from z 
according to a certain plan P, then necessarily, any table that is the only table originally constructed 
from z according to P is the very table x’ and no other”, there would be remaining counterexamples. 
 FORBES, 1986, p.8.140
 The principle can be understood as: It is not the case "that an organism could develop at one [possible] world u from 141
one collection of propagules and at another v from an entirely distinct collection of propagules, where the two collections 
both exist simultaneously at u, or more weakly, are simultaneously compossible, i.e., all exist together at the same time at 
some world.” (FORBES 1986, p.8). See also ROBERTSON, 1998.
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This version is suggested by Salmon to avoid a ship-of-Theseus type case in which a table A is first 
built according to a certain plan P, but over the time its parts would be substituted by new material 
and the original matter reassembled into a table B according to the same plan P. Under those 
circumstances, tables A and B would be taken as the same table even though they coexist. So, to 
avoid that, Salmon adds “the only table” to the premise. Despite his efforts, Robertson claims, there 
are remaining problems to be dealt with. 
 Still, an “almost-table-of-Theseus” case provides a counterexample to the weakest version of 
the premise.  Since the direct reference theorists engage on defending the Origin Essentialism due 143
to its intuitional appeal - if that is what justifies them to advocate it -, such a principle should be 
defended in such a way as to be compatible with other metaphysical intuitions we have - not 
prioritizing one among others unless there is a theoretic justification for such approach. Among the 
intuitions we have there is one that highlights the fact that it seems plausible to state that a slight 
variation in the original material constitution of an object - like a table - is possible. Taking that into 
account, a world that integrates both of these intuitions could look like: 
Suppose there is a table, Gary, that is originally constructed from matter m', which has 
all but a few molecules in common with m. Moreover, Gary is originally constructed 
in accordance with plan P. At some point in its long life, Gary comes to be constituted 
of matter that has nothing at all in common with m. (That's not a typo or a "thinko": I 
do mean m and not m'.) Matter m is gathered together and fashioned into a table, 
Harry. Moreover Harry is originally constructed in accordance with plan P. This is an 
"almost-table-of-Theseus" world. Surely it is possible for Harry to be the only table 
originally made from m according to P: indeed, that's just what Harry is in the world I 
just described. But, it seems equally possible for Gary to be the only table originally 
made from m according to P. After all, m differs from m' by only a few molecules.  144
In such a possible world, according to Salmon’s sufficiency premise Harry and Garry would be 
identified. Apart from directly pointing to the fact that the sufficient condition of Salmon has to be 
further analyzed and specified, Robertson’s point is that our metaphysical intuitions generally 
speaking are vague. So, that is a good enough reason to be suspicious about a sufficiency premise 
such as Salmon’s. And a further question raised by Robertson’s argument is that if the direct 
reference theorists claim to follow widespread intuition, they should make room for equally 
plausible intuitions - like the slight different original matter not interfering in one’s identity. Or they 
should provide us with a metaphysical committed theory to provide reasons for privilege of some 
intuitions instead of others. The remaining question seems to be whether there is such a thing as a 
defined way of splitting the properties between necessary and contingent that does not include a 
sufficiency condition. 
 See ROBERTSON, 1998, p.737-8.143
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Chapter 4 
Natural Kinds and Natural Kind Terms 
 As seen above, the direct reference theory has as two of its major icons Putnam (1962, 1973) 
and Kripke (1972). Both of these authors develop a theory in which identity statements between 
names as well as theoretical identifications are necessary – in case they are true, of course. 
According to them, such statements are the result of an identity relation between two terms rigidly 
designating only one object. Hence, the notion of rigid designator plays a core role in their 
argumentation. Nevertheless, while arguing for their thesis, they take as given the nature of the 
similarity between common nouns (such as natural kind terms) and proper names. On a closer look, 
though, there is no obvious way of transposing the definition of rigid designator from singular terms 
to the common nouns . Unless we have a reply to what it means for a common noun to be a rigid 145
designator or at least which is the nature of the similarity between common nouns and proper names, 
there is no way to state the general mechanism and use it as a tool to understand the necessary a 
posteriori identities involving general terms. Our exercise in this chapter is to consider the specifics 
of natural kind terms and what they have to say about natural kinds. Soames, Putnam and Salmon 
will be our main interlocutors in such task. 
Definition of Rigidity 
 The rigidity of proper names is recognized when we add counterfactual situations to the 
analysis of the truth value of a sentence so we can recognize a linguistic phenomenon, that names 
refer to the same object in every counterfactual situation considered - in which the object exists. In 
other words, in the case of a singular term, the object designated by it with respect to a world is the 
extension of the term at that world and saying that the name is rigid entails that it has the same 
extension at every possible world.  However, when it comes to evaluating the rigidity of common 146
nouns it is not that simple. Common nouns are general terms that can have more than one instance in 
the world and those instances - therefore, the extension of the term - may vary according to the 
 “However, there is a difficulty here that has not been widely appreciated. Kripke gives no separate definition of what it 145
means to say that a natural kind term is rigid; nor does he provide distinct arguments to show that they are 
rigid.” (SOAMES, 2002, p.245)
 P is rigid only if P has the same extension at any world in which it has a non-null extension.146
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possible world considered. For instance, if the term ‘tiger’ designates the class of actual tigers, it 
does not rigidly designates that class of individuals because we can think of possible worlds in 
which the population of tigers is bigger or smaller than the actual one - though we still say there are 
tigers in these counterfactual worlds. Therefore a definition in terms of extensionality is not 
successful in pointing to a rigidity on general terms like it does in the case of singular terms. 
 Another attempt of reconciliation is to try a definition in terms of intensionality. A semantical 
intension is understood as a function that assigns to any possible world the extension of the term 
with respect to that world . It is important to highlight that the attempt of a definition in terms of 147
intension drastically restricts the sorts of entities that can be designated by a general term.  The 148
reason for that is that the semantical function must relate to a metaphysical intension a.k.a. an 
abstract universal k that works as a function that assigns to any possible world the class of instances 
of k in that world. So, we are restricted to look for it among  properties, kinds, categories, states and 
the like. Nevertheless, despite the restriction, the definition is still not successful. In this case, the 
distinction between designation and rigid designation disappears completely . For instance, the 149
natural kind term ‘tiger’ would keep track of the same intension in all counterfactual situations 
considered - it will always pick out the tigers from each world. But the same phenomenon will be 
the case when we consider a nonnatural kind as ‘Member of a Species that Serves as Mascot for 
Princeton University’, all counterfactual situations considered, the phrase will keep track of the 
intension and, consequently, be linked to all individuals that are members of a Species that Serves as 
Mascot for Princeton University in each possible world. 
 The definition of rigidity for common nouns are far from obvious. Before going any further 
on the tentatives, we will try to state a common ground, similarities and dissimilarities between 
common nouns and proper names. As Soames points out, the proposed parallel behavior of names 
and general terms suggests that our definition follows certain demands: “(i) it must be a natural 
extension of the notion of rigidity that has been defined for singular term (ii) it must have the 
consequence that nearly all natural kind predicates are rigid, whereas many other predicates are 
 P is rigid iff there is a unique property which it stands for that determines its extension at each possible world.147
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 “for any predicate F, and any world w, the extension of F with respect to w is the set of things that have, in w, property 149
expressed by being an F. But there is no point in defining a notion of rigidity for predicates according to which all 
predicates turn out, trivially, to be rigid.” (SOAMES, 2002, p.251)
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nonrigid; and (iii) it must play a role in explaining the necessity of true “theoretical identification 
sentences””.  We are going to use those demands as guidelines on the next sections. 150
Common Nouns and Proper Names 
The only positive account that Kripke gives us on how the extension of natural kind terms is 
semantically determined is the way we fix its reference and the fact that they are nondescriptional, 
just like proper names. The term is first associated by speakers with a kind—either ostensively or via 
description. In the ostensive case, speakers associate the term with a certain sample of individuals, 
which they presume to be instances of a single natural kind. In the descriptive case, speakers employ 
a description that picks out a unique kind, often by appeal to contingent properties of a sample. Once 
the kind K has been determined, either ostensively or descriptively, it  is understood that for any 
world w the extension of the predicate at w is to be the set of instances of K at w. And a causal 
chain  takes care of keeping track of the same kind after the reference has been fixed. On the other 151
hand, the nondescriptionality comes from the use of the terms on thought experiments -  like in 
Putnam’s Twin Earth - and realizing that the descriptional content initially linked to the sample 
underdetermines  the  referent  and  can  come  across  as  a  description  satisfied  by  another  kind 
according to the counterfactual situation considered.152
 Opposing to proper names, the first noticeable characteristic that is particular to general 
terms is that they are essentially predicative. On Salmon’s words, “grammatically, a general term (in 
the singular) cannot ordinarily serve as the subject of a sentence, and one is prohibited from 
existentially generalizing on occurrences of the term in sentences”.  Also, because of their 153
characteristic of normally referring to more than one individual in a possible world, they can be 
combined with quantifiers just like properties would. Apart from the extra difficulty of falling into a 
variety of syntactic and semantic categories. 
 SOAMES, 2002, p.263.150
 “Usually, when a proper name is passed from link to link, the way the reference of the name is fixed is of little 151
importance to us. It matters not at all that different speakers may fix the reference of the name in different ways, provided 
that they give it the same referent. The situation is probably not very different for species names, though the temptation to 
think that the metallurgist has a different concept of gold from the man who has never seen any may be somewhat 
greater.” (KRIPKE, 1980, p.139)
 “All of this goes to show (i) that natural kind predicates are not synonymous with descriptive predicates that speakers 152
associate with them, and (ii) that the extension of a natural kind predicate at a world is not semantically determined to be 
the set of objects that satisfy, at that world, the descriptive characteristics we (actual-world) speakers associate with the 
predicate.” (SOAMES, 2002, p.266)
 SALMON, 2005, p.42.153
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Natural Kind Terms as Names of Abstrata 
 In Beyond Ridigity, Soames presents two problems that a theory about natural kind terms 
should respond to: the meaning problem and the depth problem - both related to accepting the 154
primary meaning of common nouns as names of abstrata. The meaning problem is raised when we 
assume that properties are the meanings of such terms. According to Soames, if that is the case then 
different terms should have different meanings since ‘water’ would mean ‘being a sample of water’ 
and ‘H2O’ would mean ‘is a drop of a substance molecules of which contain two hydrogen atoms 
and one oxygen atom’. On the other hand, the depth problem amounts to the fact that there is no 
obvious reason why samples of an object must be described by some microscopical properties 
instead of macroscopic ones. For instance, as a matter of fact, ‘water’ can be associated with the 
property of molecular structure as well as the subatomic composition.   155
 Soames takes both of these problems as indications that natural kinds should not be 
identified with properties after all. Instead, his proposal is that we understand natural kinds as 
intensions. So, the intensions - functions from worlds to extensions - are claimed to be the meaning 
of natural kinds, even though the intensions are themselves determined by properties.  That is such 156
that “semantically compound natural kind predicate, such as is a drop of a substance molecules of 
which contain two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom, has a meaning that is not identical with the 
natural kind (i.e., intension) it designates, but rather is a property that determines that intension” . 157
Nevertheless, Soames’ attempt of solving the problems - of meaning and depth - ends up committing 
him to drawing a picture in terms of speaker’s disposition . So, both the speaker’s intention and 158
her dispositions to use a term in certain ways and not in others play a role in determining the type of 
kind associated with the term. According to Soames, “since elements in the sample are often 
members of natural kinds of several different types, something about the introduction of the 
predicate, and the way speakers come to use it, must determine the specific type of kind under which 
the samples are to be subsumed”.  159
 SOAMES, 2002, p. 280-ss.154
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these different predicates must themselves be different. Thus, one cannot identify the kind water with all of them. Nor 
does there seem to be any reason to identify it with any one of them. Rather, the kind should be something that is equally 
determined by them all.” (SOAMES, 2002, p. 285)
 SOAMES, 2002, p.281.156
 SOAMES, 2002, p.279.157
 SOAMES, 2002, p.286.158
 SOAMES, 2002, p.285.159
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 The reason for that is that instances of the sample typically are instances of several natural 
kinds of different types. And only the speakers’ use of the term would distinguish among these 
types. According to Soames, “it may be intentions with various contents, or dispositions of various 
sorts”.  Therefore, on his account, the semantic presuppositions associated with natural kind terms 160
must include the claim that the individuals in the sample are members of a single natural kind of a 
given type, and the claim that both sides of a theoretical identity designate kinds of the same type.  161
For instance, the term ‘water’ would be introduced with the intention that it is to be a substance term 
that applies to everything that shares the same physical constitution as the sample  - having as a 162
result that theoretical identities would actually be necessary a priori truth since in order to state the 
identity the speaker must be aware that both terms refer to the same kind.

Stereotypes 
 Among the direct reference theorists Putnam is the one to develop in more details the idea 
that natural kind terms would have another aspect of meaning besides the propositional content - i.e, 
the referent. He instigates the discussion coining the notion of a stereotype. The stereotype is 
defined in terms of a cluster of properties - a.k.a. a descriptional content - usually associated with the 
term by the speakers. Such that, for a competent speaker, the use of a natural kind term would 
convey the associated stereotype as a consequence of the speaker being part of that language 
community. As Putnam states it, the stereotype is “the associated idea of the characteristic of a 
normal member of the kind”.  But this set of characteristics is not, in general, enough to pic out the 163
kind intended. As previously seen, Putnam claims that the psychological state of the speaker (the 
rules of use of a term) underdetermines the extension of the word.  So, he advises us “to drop the 164
word “meaning”, which is here extremely misleading: there is no one set of facts which has to be 
conveyed to convey the normal use of a word”.  165
 The characteristics do not have to uniquely identify the referent, neither do they have to 
actually be satisfied by the referent. According to Putnam, “I can refer to a natural kind by a term 
 SOAMES, 2002, p.286.160
 SOAMES, 2002, p.269.161
 “Note that if this is right, then the predicates is a drop of water and is a drop of a substance molecules of which contain 162
two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom are both understood as designating physically constitutive kinds, which means 
that they are understood as designating kinds of the same type.” (SOAMES, 2002, p.275)
 PUTNAM, 1970, p.198.163
 it is logically possible (although empirically unlikely, perhaps) that a species unrelated to the one in question might be 164
indistinguishable in appearance.
 PUTNAM, 1970, p.199.165
 59
which is “loaded” with a theory which is known not to be any longer true of that natural kind, just 
because it will be clear to everyone that what I intend is to refer to that kind, and not to assert the 
theory”.  In other words, realizing the initial characterization fails to match the referent, it is not a 166
matter of changing the meaning of the word. What guarantees that the term keeps track of the same 
kind is the speaker’s intension, “one must also convey the extension, one must indicate which kind 
the stereotype is supposed to “fit”.  Or yet, in other words, “at least there is a natural kind about 167
which we have a false theory, and that is why we can still apply the term”.  168
 Nonetheless, the intension for Putnam cannot be defined in descriptive terms either. Instead, 
it is defined in terms of an indexical component on the use of natural kind terms. When first using a 
term like that, in the baptism, either in case of using a definite description or a sample, the speaker 
contributes to the content of the term through a demonstrative. It is this demonstration of what we 
are talking about, what kind, that is the responsible for keeping track of the referent no matter the 
counterfactual circumstances considered. No descriptive content will do the trick, in Putnam’s view 
“the problem in semantic theory is to get away from the picture of the meaning of a word as 
something like a list of concepts; not to formalize that misguided picture”.  So, “the mistake is in 169
trying to represent the complex behavior of a natural kind word in something as simple as an 
analytic definition”.  Hence, within Putnam’s theory, the clarification of what type of kind we are 170
talking about is not determined descriptively but by pointing to the respective kind through a 
demonstration. And it would not be out of reason to say that Putnam’s stereotype notion shows that 
our usage of such terms presupposes the abstract kind. 
Comparison to the Attributive Use of Definite Descriptions 
 A way to test whether natural kind terms function just like names or whether they contain a 
descriptional semantic content is through a comparison with Donnellan’s analysis of definite 
descriptions. According to Donnellan, there are two ways a definite description can be used, the 
attributive and the referential use. The attributive use can also be understood as the “proper use” of a 
definite description which means that when the speaker uses such an expression she expects to 
denote that which - whatever or whoever - fits the description. On the other hand, the referential use 
 PUTNAM, 1970, pp.196-7.166
 PUTNAM, 1970, p.198.167
 PUTNAM, 1970, p.191.168
 PUTNAM, 1970, p.195.169
 PUTNAM, 1970, p.192.170
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of a definite description is when the speaker’s use intend to point to a specific object and she does so 
whether the definite description used is satisfied by that object or not. The distinction of uses can be 
grasped by the classic example of “the guy drinking a Martini”. In one case, the speaker sees a guy 
holding a glass of Martini - and presupposes that what he is drinking is a Martini - and in an attempt 
to refer to that one guy says to her friend “who is the guy drinking a Martini?”. And even if the guy 
was drinking water out of a Martini glass, her interlocutor would still be able to know who she is 
referring to and provide her with an answer to the question. In another case, the party has happened 
already and someone hear a gossip about a guy who was drinking a Martini at the party, the speaker 
did not come to party and only hears the gossip. So, in order to catch up, she asks a friend - who did 
go to the party - “who is the guy who drank Martini?”. If there was no one drinking Martinis at the 
party, her friend would not know who she intends to refer to and could not provide her with an 
answer.  171
 The two uses distinguish how the intended demonstrated comes into the picture. In one case 
the demonstratum is the intended demonstratum, in the other one, the demonstratum is the factual 
and actual thing demontraded by the expression - the one that fits the description. Shall we use this 
distinctions for our purposes now. If natural kind terms are descriptive, then they must have an 
attributive use. That is to say, the referent of the term would depend on its descriptional content in 
such a way that changing - or even specifying further - the description would imply to change the 
meaning of the word. That does not seem to be the case when it comes to natural kind terms. Kripke 
explicitly defends that further scientific investigation and eventual corrections on a kind’s common 
characteristics do not imply a change in the meaning of the word. Apparently, the direct reference 
theories conform to Putnam’s notion of stereotype better than to Soames proposal of descriptional 
content playing a role in the meaning of natural kind terms. More to the point, the natural kind terms 
as understood by the direct reference theorists seem to work in a similar manner to the referential 
use of definite descriptions - that work just like names and demonstrations, according to Donnellan. 
 See the original example on DONNELLAN, 1966, p.287.171
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Partial Remarks 
Soames’ Deviations from the Canon 
	 According to Soames, the nondescriptionality and the way we fix the reference of common 
nouns would be enough to equate their behavior to that of proper names. In his interpretation, “the 
doctrine that names are rigid designators may be viewed as a corollary of the more central thesis that 
they are nondescriptional, together with an account of how their reference is fixed in the actual 
world”.  That is to say, since names are nondescriptional there is no guarantee that the reference of 172
a name might change from world to world - like it does with definite descriptions. Once the referent 
is fixed, there is no provision for it to vary from world to world.  So, we know in advance that 173
those terms (names) are rigid designators and the intention would define what it is a designator of. 
 Within Soames proposal, the predicative use of these terms has priority. And the nominal 
form does not seem conceptually fundamental but rather complex. In his words, 
“To the extent that we understand these abstract kinds, it is because we 
already understand what it is for individuals to be dogs or mammals, and 
we take the kinds to be what any possible individual must be an instance 
of in order to be a dog or a mammal. If this is right, then the nominal use 
of these natural kind terms is understood in terms of the predicative use, 
and not vice versa.” (SOAMES, Beyond Rigidity, p.247) 
The passage comments on instances of common nouns as predicates to raise the intuition that we 
seem to understand the predicate prior to understanding any associated singular term. Hence, “it 
should be possible to state the semantic properties of these predicates independently, without having 
to derive them from the semantic properties of related singular terms, which are often 
psychologically and linguistically more complex”.  174
 On Soames’ view, then, theoretical identities are not identities strictly speaking. They are 
conditionals and biconditionals that link the intensions of the terms. This characterization seems, on 
a first glance, to be aligned with Salmon’s interpretation of the general mechanism that understands 
these identities in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions to be the object or kind it is. 
Nevertheless, Soames’ approach gives the speaker’s intension and disposition a prominent role in 
explaining the phenomenon of natural kind terms. As a consequence, within his view, certain 
theoretical identity sentences are linguistically guaranteed (to be necessary if true) - a.k.a. a priori. 
That is to say,  “the claim that they are necessary follows from the claim that they are true together 
 SOAMES, 2002, p.264.172
 SOAMES, 2002, p.264.173
 SOAMES, 2002, pp.249-50.174
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with straightforward claims about the semantics of the expressions that make them up”.  In this 175
sense, it is a characteristic of the terms themselves and the rules of use of language that determine 
the behavior of natural kind terms. So, it is noticeable that Soames seems to be sympathetic to the 
traditional theory of cognition and understanding while assuming that our epistemic access to an 
object or kind should be somehow justified within semantics.  176
Response to the Two Problems Raised by Soames 
 If we accept the primary meaning of common nouns as names of abstrata, we should address 
the two problems raised by Soames, the meaning problem and the depth problem. Within Soames 
reasoning - because he wants the meaning of a word to be transparent to the speaker -, there is no 
room for two terms with different meanings to be identified. According to him, if the meanings of 
natural kinds are abstrata, we would have to assume that their meanings are properties and ‘being a 
sample of water’ and ‘is a drop of a substance molecules of which contain two hydrogen atoms and 
one oxygen atom’ would be the meaning of water and H2O. Hence, such terms would not provide us 
with a true identity sentence. However, on Putnam’s approach, the transparency of the propositional 
content is not taken for granted. On the contrary, just like in Kripke’s, there is a difference between 
epistemic access to the object and the semantic content as well as the distinction between being a 
competent user of a language and having complete access to the object she is referring to. The 
indexical component is responsible for the speaker to point an object without necessarily 
acknowledging the object she is referring to. 
 On the other hand, the depth problem amounts to the fact that there is no obvious reason why 
samples of an object must be described by some microscopical properties instead of macroscopical 
ones - or the other way around. In other words, how we would pick one specific class or type of 
property to describe a phenomena/thing/nature. The demonstrative component once again comes 
handy to answer the problem. Since the reference is fixed through an indexical, no such descriptive 
content plays a role on the meaning of a natural kind term. Hence, as such, no definite description 
need to be chosen among other. The only descriptive content is the one Putnam defined as the 
stereotype. 
 SOAMES, 2002, p.271.175
 “In addition to speakers' explicit intentions, their dispositions to use a term in certain ways may have helped to 176
determine the type of kind associated with it. Since elements in the sample are often members of natural kinds of several 
different types, something about the introduction of the predicate, and the way speakers come to use it, must 
determine the specific type of kind under which the samples are to be subsumed.” [my emphasis] (SOAMES, 2002, p.
285)
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A Hidden Metaphysical Premise 
 The proposal of Kripke and Putnam - according to my interpretation - are more prone than 
Soames’ to distinguish and separate the metaphysical claims from semantics. Putnam with his notion 
of stereotype (brings us another perspective and) emphasizes that “the extension of our terms 
depends upon the actual nature of the particular things that serve as paradigms, and this actual nature 
is not, in general, fully known to the speaker”.  The link between the speaker’s apprehension of 177
language and successful use of words and the propositional content of the sentence she uttered is not 
direct or straightforward.  And it is possible to successfully use a word in a sentence without the 178
acknowledgment of what you are referring to, e.g., someone could talk about Phosphorus without 
acknowledging she is referring to Venus. But how could the speaker’s intension and disposition have 
a prominent role if in the direct reference theory there is room for the speaker to be unaware of facts 
or simply mistaken? The account which includes an indexical component to natural kind terms 
seems promising because it maintains some of the central characteristics of direct reference theory: 
the semantic externalism, the metaphysical neutrality and a way to explain mistakes and errors that 
might happen in the use of a language - while also keeping the interpretation of natural kind terms as 
rigid designators and the characteristic analysis of theoretical identities as necessary a posteriori 
truths. 
 Putnam’s approach also involves the intention of the speaker. However, on his account, this 
aspect of the meaning of a word is translated in terms of an indexical component - a demonstrative. 
That is to say, just like in the case of singular terms “we shall take the component of the proposition 
which corresponds to the demonstrative to be the individual demonstrated. Thus the varying forms 
which such a demonstration can take are not reflected in the content of the utterance (i.e., the 
proposition)”.  The demonstrative component is responsible for providing the semantical rule that, 179
once the circumstances are fixed, the referent of such term is fixed to be the actual referent. So, just 
like names, instead of being understood as constant functions over possible worlds, they should be 
seen as independent from the circumstances.  The reason for that is that “the propositional 180
 PUTNAM, 1973b, p.711.177
 Here we defend the reason for non-transparency is the same as the one proposed for demonstratives by Kaplan: 178
“Erroneous beliefs may lead a speaker to put on a demonstration which does not demonstrate what he thinks it does, with 
the result that he will be under a misapprehension as to what he has said. Utterances of identity sentences containing 
one or more demonstratives may express necessary propositions, though neither the speaker nor his auditors are aware 
of it. In fact, we get extreme cases in which linguistic competence is simply insufficient to completely determine the 
content of what is said.” (KAPLAN, 1978, p.231)
 KAPLAN, 1978, p.230.179
 “The possible world semantics is misleading because it leads you to believe the distinction between names and 180
definite descriptions is that the first ones are a constant function when it is actually independent of the 
circumstance” (KAPLAN, 1989, p.497)
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component need not choose its designatum from those offered by a passing circumstance; it has 
already secured its designatum before the encounter with the circumstance” . Hence, the parallel 181
proposed by Kripke can be maintained since natural kind terms could be interpreted like proper 
names are: “I might simply resolve to use them [names] demonstratively (i.e., as demonstrating the 
individual whom they are a name of , in the nomenclature of an earlier paper (Kaplan, 1968)”.  182
 Salmon (2005) notices that whether we take natural kind terms as descriptional or non-
descriptional - or as primarily predicatives or names of abstract kinds, we cannot avoid a 
metaphysical premise such as ‘being an instance of the same K-kind as something consists, at least 
in part, in having the same ‘φ-property that the given thing has’.  Even through Putnam’s 183
perspective, calling something by a natural kind term indicates that it probably fits a certain cluster 
of characteristics known by the folk and - even if it does not - it is supposed to have some sort of 
“essential nature” which it shares with other members of that natural kind. The difference would be 
that the essential nature of a kind would not be accounted for within semantics as Soames proposes. 
It would suggest there is an essential nature and the existence of abstrata - aside from properties 
themselves - nonetheless. So, one way or another there is an unavoidable metaphysical commitment 
in order to explain the rigidity of natural kind terms. 
 Beyond the challenges and developments here exposed, Soames presents yet an extra layer in 
the discussion of the rigidity of natural kind terms, demanding distinct treatment and justification for 
their rigidity when they are subject and predicate of a sentence.  Even if we take natural kind terms 184
as names of abstracta when they are the subject of a proposition, things are different when the term 
is used as a predicate of an individual object. In such case, it is undeniable that it raises the intuition 
that the natural kind term works as a set of individuals. Hence, the reason why they should be taken 
as rigid terms when used in the predicative position cannot be other than metaphysical. In other 
words, Soames makes explicit the distinction between the term designating the same kind with 
respect to all worlds and the claim that if the predicate applies to something in one world it does so 
in all worlds in which that thing exists. 
 KAPLAN, 1989, p.496-7.181
 KAPLAN, 1978, p.232-3182
 “If a nondescriptional general term applies to some things but not others, then there must be something that the 183
individuals in its extension have in common, by virtue of which the term applies to them but not anything else, even 
though the term is nondescriptional. The objects in its extension must be of the same kind, and the term must be a 
nondescriptional label for things of that kind.” (SALMON, 2005, pp.44-5)
 “When one looks at the passage as a whole, it is hard to avoid feeling tempted to run two things together: (i) the 184
rigidity of ‘pain’ when used as an abstract singular term for a certain abstract kind of thing and (ii) the essentiality of ‘pain’ 
when used as a predicate of individual pains. One may get the impression from the passage that these are the same 
thing, or at any rate that they inevitably go together. This, of course, is not so in the general case.” (SOAMES, 2002, p.
253)
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Chapter 5 
The Nature of Objects as Source of Modal Assertions 
 Fine advocates the a priori philosophical analysis of the object in order to state its essential 
properties just like Salmon does. However, Fine’s approach grounds the modal notions - and, 
therefore, the necessary properties of the object - on the definitional notion of an object (or kind). 
The reason for that is his thesis that saying that two terms are synonymous does give us a grasp 
neither of the meaning of the terms involved nor of the truth value of such synonymy. So, the 
irreducibility of objects and kinds - a.k.a. their haecceities - is not enough on Fine’s view. According 
to him, the answer to what essential properties of an object or kind are should come from the nature 
of these objects themselves. The nature of objects should be analyzable in terms of their properties 
and that should work as a source of statements related to objects’ essence. Our goal is to compare 
Fine’s proposal to the strictly modal characterization and delve into his criticisms and how much of 
it we can apply on the direct reference theorists characterization of essence. 
Necessity and Essence 
The concept of essence is understood among the direct reference theorists - like in a 
majority of their contemporary philosophers - in modal terms. In such interpretation, the question 
about essential properties is directly connected to the question of whether there is modality de 
re. That is to say, the question about essential properties depends on the possibility of assigning 
necessary and contingent properties directly to objects. Fine’s concern is that this view has 
influenced our understanding of metaphysics as a whole. It could give us the impression that 
metaphysics is part of a broader study of modality de re. And, consequently, the subject would be 
understood as a part of applied modal logic.  185
Fine agrees that all essential properties of an object are necessary properties of that 
object. However, he disagrees that the modal considerations we can make are sufficient criteria to 
determine which properties are essential to an object. So, Fine challenges the definition “an object 
 FINE, 1994, p.3.185
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has a property essentially just in case it is necessary that the object has the property [if it is identical 
to that very object/ if it exists]” by arguing against the notion of essence being extensionally 
equivalent to a modal notion.  Through counter examples, he states the fact that not all 186
metaphysical necessities are contained in the essence of a particular object - i.e., essence is not 
reducible to metaphysical necessity. Consider Socrates and the singleton-set whose sole element is 
Socrates, namely {Socrates}. Standard views on modal set-theory agree that: (a) Necessarily, if 
Socrates exists, Socrates belongs to {Socrates}. Granted that (b) Necessarily, the singleton exists if 
Socrates exists. Then, (c) Necessarily, Socrates belongs to singleton Socrates if both Socrates and 
the singleton exist. If, in addition, we accept the modal account of essence, it follows: (d) Socrates 
essentially belongs to singleton Socrates (if he exists). It is not critical to the example that it appeals 
to an abstract entity  or that we accept the definition on modal terms that is conditional to 187
existence  - even though there is a problem particular to the existential interpretation. Consider 188
Socrates again. Generally accepted principle is: (a) It is necessarily the case that he exists if he 
exists. However, if we accept the modal account of essence, it entails: (b) Socrates essentially 
exists.  189
Fine’s  goal  is  to  show that  we can agree on the necessary properties  and still  deny the 
essentialist  ones.  All that is necessary is that we recognize the intelligibility of a position which 190
makes such claims as the ones given in his examples. For, as he says, “any reasonable account of 
essence should not be biased towards one metaphysical view rather than the other. It should not 
settle, as a matter of definition, any issue which we are inclined to regard as a matter of 
substance”.  The core of his examples is that there is an asymmetry on the concept of essence that 191
cannot be translated into the modal notion. If all necessary properties of an object are essential to 
that object, nothing would prevent other necessary properties from also being included in its 
essence. For instance, consider Socrates and the truth of mathematics that there are infinitely many 
 “My objection to the modal accounts will be to the sufficiency of the proposed criterion, not to its necessity. I accept 186
that if an object essentially has a certain property then it is necessary that it has the property (or has the property if it 
exist); but I reject the converse” (FINE, 1994, p.4.).
 There is also the argument against essential distinctness. Consider Socrates and the Eiffel Tower. A generally 187
accepted principle is: (a) Necessarily, if Socrates exists, Socrates is distinct from the Eiffel Tower. However, if we accept 
the modal account of essence, it entails: (b) Socrates is essentially distinct from the Eiffel Tower, if he exists. See FINE, 
1994, p.5.
 The same example of Socrates and singleton Socrates could be proposed for the number 2 and {2}, necessary 188
existents. See FINE,1994, p.5.
 See FINE, 1994, p.6.189
 “It seems to be possible to agree on all of the modal facts and yet disagree on the essentialist facts. But if any modal 190
criterion of essence were correct, such a situation would be impossible.” (FINE, 1994 p.8)
 FINE, 1994, p.5.191
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prime numbers, then (a) Necessarily, there are infinitely many prime numbers. Also, by the nature of 
(material) conditionals: (b) Necessarily, there are infinitely many prime numbers, if Socrates exists. 
So, if we accept the modal account of essence, it entails: (c) Socrates is essentially such that (if 
Socrates exists) there are infinitely many prime numbers. The required notion of relevance to restrict 
which necessary properties are included in the essence of an object would already presuppose the 
concept of essence in question. In Fine’s words, “there is nothing in the “logic” of the situation to 
justify an asymmetric judgement of relevance; the difference lies entirely in the nature of the objects 
in question”.  192
 Hence, when it comes to essential properties, we should take into consideration not only the 
logical status (the necessity or contingency) of a property assigned to an object, but also the source 
that provides such assertions and ensures their truth values. As Fine says, “if certain objects are 
essentially related then it is necessarily true that the objects are so related. However, the resulting 
necessary truth is not necessary simpliciter. For it is true in virtue of the identity of the objects in 
question”.  Fine’s attempt is  to take the burden from logic and address that  the answers about 193
essence should come from the nature of the object itself  - from metaphysics and no other field (like 
logic or language). The necessity of essential properties should be stated for no other reason than a 
metaphysical principle.  194
Objects as Source of True Propositions
Fine understands the question about how names refer to objects and the problem of the 
identity and the essence of these objects as distinct issues. On one hand, there is “the question of 
whether the mechanism of reference requires a descriptive intermediary, of whether one can refer to 
anything independently of how it is described”.  And, on the other hand, “there is the question of 195
whether the mechanism of necessary attribution requires a descriptive intermediary, of whether one 
can attribute a necessary property to an object independently of how it is described” . And when it 196
 FINE, 1994, p.7.192
 FINE, 1994, p.7.193
 “It is important to appreciate that the problem cases here do not simply arise from the requirement that the essential 194
properties of an object be closed under logical consequence. For even with this requirement is in force, we would not 
want to say that it is essential to Socrates that the various necessary truths (as opposed to logical truths) be the case. 
Thus the problem is not an instance of the familiar problem of "logical omniscience”.” (FINE, 1994, p.7)
 FINE, 2005, p.29.195
 FINE, 2005, p.30.196
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comes to the second issue, Fine disclaims the account of modal considerations as sufficient criteria 
in order to determine which are the essential properties of an object and, by doing so, focuses on the 
nature of objects. According to him, the notion of essence depends on the notion of an object having 
properties by its own nature, without this being previously linked with any specific description.  197
 Hence, Fine’s approach analyzes the nature of objects as source of modal assertions. As he 
says, “each object, or selection of objects, makes its own contribution to the totality of necessary 
truths; and one can hardly expect to determine from the totality itself what the different 
contributions were”.  So, instead of viewing essence as a special case of metaphysical necessity, 198
his view advocates that metaphysical necessities are special cases of essence.  That is such that 199
“the metaphysically necessary truths can then be identified with the propositions which are true in 
virtue of the nature of all objects whatever”.  In other words, the truth of metaphysically necessary 200
propositions would have their source in the objects which are the subject of the essentialist claims 
considered. 
 The direct reference theorists’ answer to what an object is is given in terms of its haecceities 
- which is unanalyzable - and their understanding of the qualifying phrase “if the object is to be the 
object that it is” is either vacuous on the categorical account or too strong on the conditional account 
over existence.  Contra such proposal, Fine addresses such issue reclaiming the interpretation of 201
essence as real definitions of objects - in parallel to the definition of words . So, in his 202
interpretation, the qualifying phrase would consist in “if it is to be the (object) that it is [concept]”. 
According to Fine, the notion of essence cannot be understood in fundamentally different terms. 
But, still, his approach to the matter allows him to deal with different standards of ontological 
dependence and captures subtleties that are not recognizable through modal logic alone. This 
approach has the potential of deviating from an analysis in terms of sufficient conditions for 
identification. The reason for it is that his approach could be enough to the denial of any 
interpretation in absolute terms - without which the notion of sufficient condition misses its initial 
 FINE, 2005, p.22-23.197
 FINE, 1994, p.9.198
 “Thus each class of objects is taken to give rise to its own modal operator, its own "sphere" of necessity; and it is the 199
task of the logic of essence to lay down the laws which govern each of these spheres and the way they interact” (FINE, 
1995a, p.242).
 FINE, 1994, p.9.200
 “for whatever property we take the phrase to attribute to the object must be an essential property of that object” (FINE, 201
1994, p.6).
 “On the one hand [in opposition to the modal notion], essence as been conceived on the model of definition. It has 202
been supposed that the notion of definition has application to both words and objects - that just as we may define a word, 
or say what it means, so we may define an object, or say what it is” (FINE, 1994, p.2).
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sense. By doing so, and focussing on the nature of the objects, he can support the idea of giving 
reasons as to why we take some properties as necessary instead of others. 
Definitional Account 
 So, Fine stands for the idea of real definition of objects. That is the way through which he 
can justify and explain the truth of essential propositions. In other words, giving a real definition we 
are provided with the essence of an object, i.e., with the set of propositions that are true in virtue of 
the object’s nature. Therefore, the nature of objects would precede the necessary propositions and 
properties that we identify through thought experiments. According to Fine, then, there is no such 
thing as to discover the essence of an object empirically - through scientific enquiry. On the 
contrary, metaphysics is a purely a priori subject. 
 On his approach, Fine explains essence and its relation to necessity in comparison to the 
quest of meaning through the notion of analyticity. As he says, “the study of semantics is no more 
exhausted by the claims of analyticity than is the metaphysics of identity exhausted by the claims of 
necessity”.  Often, an analytic truth is understood as a sentence that is true in virtue of the meaning 203
of terms. In such a way that, sentences that are true in virtue of the meaning of terms are taken as 
logical consequences of the definitions of the terms involved. This reductionist view exhibits similar 
problems to those acknowledged by Fine in the reductionist view of essential properties as the 
necessary properties of the object. For instance, any arbitrary analytic truth A is a logical 
consequence of an analytic sentence P and hence presumably also true in virtue of the meaning of 
P.  And that shows that it is possible to agree on the facts of analyticity and yet disagree on the 204
facts of meaning, since we have the intuition that not every analytic truth can be derived from a 
sentence P which involves specific terms and strict vocabulary. 
 In a similar manner to his metaphysical approach, he suggests that “these difficulties are 
avoided if we require the definitional truths which figure in the account of analyticity to be true in 
virtue of the meanings of their defined content”.  Granted the intelligibility of the relativized form 205
of analyticity, Fine counts on that notion to provide us with an explanation of the truth of analytic 
 FINE, 1994, p.12.203
 FINE, 1994, p.11.204
 FINE, 1994, pp.12-3.205
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sentences - just like the essence of objects would be the source of necessary propositions. His 
proposal is that “the account of analyticity to be true in virtue of the meaning of their defined terms. 
For the account is then as about as direct as it could be; and real content is given to the idea of 
analysis”.  Hence, those are the terms in which Fine draws his comparison, while the attempt to 206
define a term must have a specification which makes it clear what the meaning is, the attempt to 
define an object must have a specification which makes it clear what the object is. Thus, “the 
activities of specifying the meaning of a word and of stating what an object is are essentially the 
same [a.k.a., giving an essence if not of a word’s meaning, of an object itself]; and hence each of 
them has an equal right to be regarded as a form of definition”.  207
Ontological Dependence 
 The direct reference theorists would reduce the essential properties of an object (or kind) to 
those that it must (i.e., necessarily) have in order to exist. By challenging such a position, Fine is 
challenging the idea that “essential dependence just is modal requirement for existence” . Even 208
though Fine accepts that essential dependence leads to modal requirement for existence, he denies 
the converse with his counter examples. Furthermore, Fine’s proposal main intent is to show that if 
we are willing to give up on the modal/existential account of essence, we are provided with a wider 
range of dependence relationships between objects - including asymmetrical ones that can justify 
our intuitive inclinations. 
 Instead of understanding the necessity operator in terms of the identity of an object - which is 
an unanalysable haecceity according to direct reference theory - Fine takes the relationship between 
the identity of object and a proposition as unanalysable and understands “the identity or being of the 
object in terms of the propositions rendered true by its identity rather than the other way round” . 209
Such a conception of essence understands it in terms of definitions of objects. Hence, each object 
would be the source  of a set of true propositions and its identity would be understood through its 210
 FINE, 1994, p.12.206
 FINE, 1994, p.14.207
 CORREIA, 2008, p.1018.208
 FINE, 1995b, p.273.209
 A distinction that is worth mentioning is that the notion of a proposition being rendered true by the object’s identity as 210
ambiguous between an object as being sufficient to determine the truth value of a sentence or the strong claim that the 
object being a source should be understood as the factor that makes propositions true. It is not clear in Fine’s works here 
quoted which your be his preferred interpretation. Although it does not seem to be necessary for Fine to stand for the 
stronger claim in order to advocate the idea of a plurality of ontological dependences.  
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associated set. Consequently, on Fine’s interpretation, the ontological dependence between objects is 
given in terms of the objects that might appear as a constituent of a definition of a specific object - 
i.e., as a constituent of a component proposition or property that is true in virtue of the identity of 
that object. In his words, 
“we can distinguish, in a nominal definition, between the term defined and the 
terms by which it is defined, so we can distinguish, in a real definition, between 
the object defined and the objects by which it is defined. The notion of one object 
depending upon another is therefore the real counterpart to the nominal notion of 
one term being definable in terms of another” . 211
On Fine’s account, as exposed above, objects that are part of an essential proposition are taken as 
part of the defined object’s essence. Hence, the notion of essence is taken as constitutive rather than 
consequential in character. That is to say, “an essential property of an object is a constitutive part of 
the essence of that object if it is not had in virtue of being a consequence of some more basic 
essential properties of the object”.  Otherwise, it is a consequential part of the essence, one that is 212
definitive of the object only through its connection with other properties. This variation makes room 
for anyone to be able to factor out and recognize what the contributions made by logic are to the 
object’s essence  and restrain the immediate essence of an object to strictly metaphysical claims. 213
Roughly speaking, the immediate nature “will include only what has a direct bearing on the 
object”  while the mediate account will include what derives from the nature of the other objects 214
involved in the constitutive essence - as in a chain - and whatever comes from logical inferences. 
These two distinct notions of essence give rise to two corresponding notions of dependence, “one 
object will immediately depend upon an another if it pertains to the immediate nature of the other, 
while one object will mediately depend upon another if it pertain to its mediate nature” .  215 216
 Other dependence notions rise from slight variations in the notion of essence. For instance, 
regarding cycles, when we consider cases of reflexive or reciprocal definitions of essence. The first 
case is the simplest, corresponding to a self-related property of an object is a reflexive property and 
 FINE, 1995b, p.275.211
 FINE, 1995a, p.57.212
 The consequentialist notion of essence is yet twofold, there are those properties that are taken into account because 213
they are derived from the constitutive essence, and there are the ones that come as a result of logical closure (i.e., the 
operation of admitting all logical consequences). The last ones are distinguished by the fact that they can be “generalized 
away” while the first one’s cannot. See FINE, 1995b, p.277.
 FINE, 1995b, p.281.214
 FINE, 1995a, p.61.215
 “It is this idea, that the essence of an object might be mediate, that explains why we are inclined to say, in case x 216
depends upon y, that what x is will depend, not just upon y, but upon what y is. For in this case, the essence of x will 
literally incorporate the essence of y. All those propositions that are true in virtue of the nature of y will be true in virtue of 
the nature of x” (FINE, 1995b, p.281).
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that alone avoids circularity. But in the case of simultaneous definition of the essence of two objects 
(or kinds), each one mentioning the other in its essence, our way out is not as simple. We have two 
options - which lead to two distinct dependence relations. First, the dependence is only one way, so 
we can define Watson as the admirer of Holmes and we can define Holmes as the person admired by 
Watson, but we cannot use both definitions in a single system. Second, the dependence is a two way 
dependence and it is built through a relation such that Holmes and Watson are defined in terms of 
each other by the fact that, as a pair, they are in a relationship of admiration.  The first option 217
shows us that both the single definitions isolated considered and the system of definitions as a whole 
must be taken into consideration in the analysis. The second option opens the possibility of 
constitutive essence possessing not only essential properties but also essential relationships.  218
The Plurality of Essence 
 Last but not least, Fine’s account embraces the possibility of an object having multiple and 
alternative definitions of its essence. In the traditional account, essence is understood as a singular 
set of properties that necessarily belong to the object taken into consideration. On the other hand, 
Fine’s understanding replaces the traditional idea with a plurality of such definitions. And the notion 
of ontological dependence follows that diversification and it can vary from weak to strong 
dependence according to whether an object is defined as definitively or essentially being a certain 
way. Alternative definitions come from defining something in terms of different particulars one at a 
time, like the definition of red as the color of each particular red thing. Even though a red thing did 
not necessarily had to be red and, therefore, the color could not be defined in terms of that object, 
the existence of the color itself would not vanish because of that. So, there would be an essence 
corresponding to each of these definitions but red would only weakly depend on them. In order to 
have a strong dependence, the definition should be constituted only by what is common to all the 
definitions. In other words, “in the first case, the given object can be defined in terms of the other; 
and in the second case, it must be defined in terms of the other”.  And there is still a third notion of 219
 “it is plausible to suppose that, when there is a simultaneous definition of two objects, this definition is not a logical 217
consequence of their separate definitions; objects are not needlessly defined simultaneously. Let us therefore say that an 
essential relationship between two or more objects is irreducible if it is not a logical consequence of the essential 
properties of the objects considered separately or of the essential relationships among disjoint proper subsets of the 
objects.” (FINE, 1995b, 284) 
Also, see example in FINE, 1995b, p.66.
 FINE, 1995b, p.282.218
 FINE, 1995b, p.285.219
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essence, as a manifold, that includes all the alternative definitions as multifarious rather than 
propositional in character - while the other two are propositional in form. 
 It is pressing to acknowledge that this plurality of essences and ontological dependences 
could not come from a modal account of essence. That is because the only possible attempt to 
constrain the notion of essence in modal terms is to define it in terms of  “x depends upon y just in 
case y cannot be generalized out of the necessary properties of x (or those that are conditionally 
necessary upon the existence of x)”.  Those constraints - as we have seen previously  - fail, since 220 221
we can derive any necessary properties from the essence of an object. Therefore, Fine’s account 
substitutes a single dependency notion with a cluster of ontological dependences in which each 
relation of dependence corresponds to a system of definitions. It is for that same reason that Fine 
dismisses the traditional attempt of defining meaning through synonymy classes.  On the 222
traditional one-dependence-notion view one might as well extract any predicate from the given 
analytic statement by using an artificial “definition”. Since on this account the meaning is not 
anchored on any concept whatsoever - just like essence is not anchored on the nature of the objects - 
we can derive any sort of trivial pseudo-analysis. As Fine says, “there is nothing in the underlying 
conception of definitional truth which will force the resulting derivations to be analyses in any 
meaningful sense of the term” . 223
Partial Remarks
Natural Necessity
Besides distinguishing multiple notions on ontological dependence, Fine also claims that not 
all  sorts  of  dependence  can  be  understood  in  terms  of  metaphysical  necessity.  In  other  words, 
according to Fine, there are forms of necessity that are distinct and not reducible to one another. Fine 
 FINE, 1995b, 279.220
 See previous sections Necessity and Essence, and Objects as source of True Propositions. 221
An example of failure is given in FINE, 1995b, p.279: “But then every object would depend upon every other. For given 
that x and y are distinct, it is a necessary property of x to be distinct from y (or to be distinct from y if x exists). But the y 
here cannot be generalized out, since it is not a necessary property of x to be distinct from every object whatever. This 
difficulty does not arise under our own non-modal construal of essence, since we cannot in general assert, where x is 
distinct from y, that x is essentially distinct from y”.
 “So just as the essence of an object can be identified with the class of its essential properties, the meaning of a term 222
can be identified with the class sentences that are analytic in the term, thereby providing a much more satisfactory 
account of the meaning than the one in terms of synonymy classes.” (FINE, 1995a, p.56)
 FINE, 1994, p.12.223
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argues that the irreducible notions are at least three: the metaphysical, the natural and the normative 
-  apart  from disputing  the  idea  that  metaphysical  necessity  can  be  defined  in  terms  of  logical 
necessity . Here we will focus on the distinction that directly affects our subject matter the most, 224
the separation between metaphysical and natural necessities.
Understanding  natural  necessity  as  “the  form  of  necessity  that  pertains  to  natural 
phenomena”,  Fine starts with the claim that it is conceivable  that natural laws could fail to hold. 225 226
And Fine argues for it twisting Kripke’s argument on schimidentity.  Roughly, the schimidentity 227
argument  for  the  metaphysical  necessity  of  the  inverse  square  law would be given in  terms of 
granting  that  whatever  possible  world  we  consider  in  which  it  might  seem  like  that  is  not  a 
metaphysical truth is a world in which we are dealing with schmass instead of mass. That is to say, 
mass necessarily has the properties it does and if something looks like mass but does not entail the 
inverse square law, it ought to be schmass  (a.k.a. something that looks like mass but is distinct from 
it). Fine’s twist is given by stipulating that there is no such a thing as schmass and admitting that that 
should be understood as a natural necessity.  Now, it is a metaphysical possibility that there is 228
schmass otherwise it  would not  be possible to stipulate it  in the first  place.  So,  the absence of 
schmass is a natural necessity that is not a metaphysical necessity.
What Fine wants to convey is that:
Indeed, there is no reason in general why the sophisticated post-Kripkean should 
not agree with the naive pre-Kripkean as to which of the metaphysically possible 
worlds are naturally impossible. For whereas the pre-Kripkean will take such a 
world to be a natural impossibility because of the straightforward failure of a law, 
the post-Kripkean will take it to be a natural impossibility because of the 
instantiation of an alien property or kind. Thus even though sensitivity to the cross-
world identity of natural properties or kinds may lead one to redescribe the 
hypothetical situations in which a natural law is taken to fail, it should not lead one 
to reject the natural impossibility of those situations.  229
The same point is conveyed by counter-examples that do not appeal to uninstantiated properties or 
kinds. For instance, we can agree on the fact that it is a natural necessity that every object belongs to 
one of the actual kinds that there are. But, according to Fine, it will not be a metaphysical necessity - 
 “It is, in the first place, not at all clear that metaphysical necessity can be defined in terms of logical necessity, for it is 224
not clear that one can provide a nonmodal characterization of some basic metaphysically necessary truths from which all 
other metaphysically necessary truths will be a logical consequence”. (FINE, 2002, p.3)
 FINE, 2002, p.4.225
 It should not be left unnoticed that conceivability is equivalent to being metaphysically possible to Fine.226
 See KRIPKE, 1980, p.108 and also FINE, 2002, p.5-6.227
 Since the inverse square law is taken to be a natural necessity itself.228
 FINE, 2002, p.6.229
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there could have been other kinds . And even if instead of supposing a reductionism between 230
metaphysical and natural necessities we try to assume - for the direct reference theorists sake - that a 
definition of natural necessity in terms of a relative metaphysical necessity, counter-examples still 
remain. The problem of understanding natural necessity as relative is the common problem of 
relative definitions: why would the necessity it issues not be of trivial sort since “any true 
proposition whatever can be seen as necessary under the adoption of a suitable definition of relative 
necessity” ? Another way of highlighting the dissent between the two notions of necessity is by 231
leading consequences of each kind of necessity. If a proposition - something like e causes f - is 
naturally necessary but not metaphysically necessary, “we are inclined to think in such a case that 
there exists a genuine possibility of the propositions being false”.  Conversely, “if a proposition 232
were a metaphysical necessity though not a natural necessity (in the narrow sense), then there would 
be no genuine possibility of its being false, since the ‘hardness’ of the metaphysical necessity would 
stand in the way”.  233
Non Transparency 
 The irreducible character of natural and metaphysical necessities is also the key to 
understanding Fine’s approach to modal transparency. According to Fine, because of the aprioricity 
of its method and the generality of its subject-matter, metaphysical truths are modally transparent. 
The definition of transparency is that “roughly speaking, a concept is transparent if there is no 
significant gap between the concept and what it is a concept of” . That is something achieved by 234
metaphysical concepts due to they being concepts of the structure of reality. They play a role of a 
priori foundation for truth that link empirical knowledge to eidict truths - understanding a field of 
enquiry to be eidictic “if its truths are all and only those propositions true in virtue of its subject-
matter” . 235
 For example, the proposition “Water is H2O”. A metaphysical true principle is that (1) any 
substance with a given composition is by its nature of that composition. And by empirical enquiry 
 FINE, 2002, p.7.230
 FINE, 2002, pp.13-4.231
 FINE, 2002, p.26.232
 FINE, 2002, p.26.233
 FINE, 2012, p.9.234
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we discover that (2) water is a substance whose composition is H2O. The two propositions lead us to 
the conclusion that (3) water is by its nature H2O. On Fine’s account, (3) is understood as a 
necessary truth but not a metaphysical one - it is a natural necessity that water is H2O. And that is 
the reason why he states that: 
[T]he concept of water will not be modally transparent since it will not necessarily be 
a concept of water (i.e. of H2O). The thought then is that the modal transparency of 
individual concepts will be sufficient to guarantee their epistemic transparency and 
that it is only because of the presence of a modally opaque concept (such as water in 
water is H2O) that a necessary truth might fail to be a priori.  236
On the previous quote, when Fine states that H2O is not necessarily a concept of water, he intends 
the necessity to be metaphysical. Hence, metaphysical necessary truths are always transparent for 
him. Although, natural necessities are not. And that is a consequence of those necessity notions 
being non reducible or translatable in terms of one another. 
Essence as Definition vs. Modal Systems
Fine’s commitment to the notion of definition leads him to state that “if a given property is 
essential, then so is the property of essentially having that property” . In other words, definitions 237
cannot change from world to world. But modal facts do change from world to world. If definitions 
cannot  change according to the world considered and metaphysical  necessity is  supposed to be 
grounded on the definitions, then metaphysical necessities cannot change from world to world - they 
behave as an iterated necessity. And if metaphysical necessities cannot change, we are compelled to 
affirm that the correct logic to do metaphysics is either system S4 or S5 . Aside from the internal 238
incongruence with Fine’s initial proposal of developing a metaphysics which is neutral on its 
relations to logic, S4 and S5 are arguably not the best systems to evaluate metaphysical necessity 
and Fine would be exposed to those arguments too . 239
 There is no room here for a detailed discussion, but let me outline some considerations 
relevant to the topic and its fitting into the picture of a direct reference theory of language. First, we 
should keep in mind that the core of Fine’s criticism is that the necessity of identity is a symmetrical 
 FINE, 2012, p.24-5.236
 FINE, 1994, p.1.237
 Due to the principle (4) □□φ → □φ being a truth of logic in those systems.238
 See SALMON, 1989.239
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relation while essence stands for an asymmetrical relation, so there is no way to explain one in terms 
of the other. Well, the asymmetry and non transitivity of some dependence relations could be 
explained in modal terms if we consider a weaker system than S4 and S5 that is asymmetrical and 
not transitive. Second, throughout these works when philosophers talk about objects they are not 
talking about ordinary objects as they stand in the actual world. In contrast with the ordinary 
intuition, when philosophers talk about objects they consider the object’s entire modal profile - as a 
scattered object with pieces in each and every world in which the ordinary object is said to exist. 
Fine deals with that by presupposing that the necessary properties of an object are already included 
in its definitions. The direct reference theorists, like Kripke, do that through setting the modal profile 
according to the possible worlds considered - through the thought experiments. While the modal 
profile on Fine’s account is rigid, the modal profile on Kripke’s account is also rigidified by his 
actualism. Nevertheless, the modal accounts have an advantage that the modal profile can vary 
according to the possible world considered if we leave the actualist position aside. That possibility 
of flexibility can be helpful when dealing with classical problems such as the Chandler’s Paradox  240
and any other problems raised by premises that consider the possibility of objects going through 
small changes but still conserving their identities. 
 CHANDLER, 1976. Also, CHISHOLM, 1967 and FORBES, 1984.240
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Final Remarks 
 As we have seen, the direct reference theory does originate necessary a posteriori truths 
when two names of the same object assume the subject and predicate positions in an identity 
sentence. The reason for that is that proper names in the direct reference theory are understood as 
rigid designators, referring to one and the same object no matter the counterfactual situation 
considered. As such, identities between two names are interpreted as self-identity propositions. For 
that same reason, the necessity of these claims does not derive from the names themselves - as if 
semantics infringed on metaphysical fields - but from rigid designation devises in general. Kripke’s 
strategy is to assume that theoretical discoveries involving natural kind terms when put in terms like 
“water is H2O” are supposed to behave the same way as the identities between proper names do and, 
therefore, be necessary a posteriori propositions as well. So, these should be understood in parallel 
to the more simple examples like “Hesperus is Phosphorus”. Kripke’s move highlights what Putnam 
already did on his writings and the direct reference theorists seem all do to some extent: they 
presuppose that natural kind terms are rigid designator devices too. 
 Even though the definition of rigid designator is not easily transposed to general terms, as 
Soames discloses, the option of considering a pure indexical (dthat) component within the meaning 
of natural kind terms seems promising. Besides avoiding problems raised by Soames in taking 
natural kind terms as properties, that option adjusts well to Putnam’s notion of stereotype. That is 
such that the meaning of a natural kind term would be constituted by a descriptional content grasped 
by the competent user of a language plus the pure demonstrative component that is translated as the 
kind itself being part of the content of the term. Hence, natural kind terms would behave like names 
because they are directly understood as direct reference devices instead of being recognized as such 
by evaluating counterfactual situations,  just like Kaplan wants the direct reference terms to be. 241
Therefore, this option seems to attend all the requirements made by the tradition of direct reference 
theorists. 
 Nevertheless, this account does not imply that the identity sentences involving natural kind 
terms and properties discovered by science are necessary a posteriori propositions. On the contrary, 
 “The semantical feature that I wish to highlight in calling an expression directly referential is not the fact that it 241
designates the same object in every circumstance, but the way in which it designates an object in any circumstance. 
Such an expression is a device of direct reference. This does not imply that it has no conventionally fixed semantical rules 
which determine its referent in each context of use; quite the opposite. There are semantical rules which determine the 
referent in each context of use - but that is all. The rules do not provide a complex which together with a circumstance of 
evaluation yields an object. They just provide an object. (Kaplan, 1989, p.495).
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as we have seen, the only kind of proposition that is guaranteed to be necessary a posteriori are 
those ones whose content is self-identity. So, unless we interpret scientific terms like “the individual 
grown from x sperm and z egg”, “the element with the atomic number 79”, “H2O”, “stream of 
photons” as names for Meg, gold, water, light respectively the modal status of the respective identity 
sentences cannot be guaranteed only by semantics. However, that is in fact an option of 
interpretation within the direct reference theory. If we accept the previous proposal of understanding 
natural kind terms as containing an indexical character, we can extend that understanding to other 
terms as well, like the ones coined by science. Whether scientifically discovered properties of an 
object (or kind) are essential to it or not, that discovery is widespread in the linguistic community. 
And, from then on, the discovery can be used as a label for the object or kind. 
 As we have seen, the meaning of kinds are constantly evolving according the boosting of 
technology and science and that does not keep them from referring to the same kinds as before - one 
more reason to sustain that there is an indexical component on kinds’ meaning. As a competent 
speaker of such a community it is the speaker’s role to update the meaning of the term (even if only 
roughly) as the knowledge of the community grows. That is such that some of the scientific 
vocabulary becomes part of the stereotype of natural kinds.  Like in the case of water that is 242
widely known as H2O these days. Like in Kripke’s example of , it was at first stipulated to mean 
“the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter” but it now works as a name for a real 
number . The same applies to H2O, it initially stood for the descriptive content “molecule 243
constituted by two hydrogen and one oxygen atoms” but now it can be used as a name and synonym 
to water. And even in cases in which there is no abbreviation to the description, the fact that it 
superficially looks like a description should not deviate our attention from the fact that it is being 
used as a name, in referential use. 
 In that interpretation we are able to concede to Kripke’s statement that “theoretical identities, 
according to the conception I advocate, are generally identities involving two rigid designators and 
therefore are examples of the necessary a posteriori” . But the reason for that is that speakers use 244
the scientific information as a direct reference device even if its definite description per se is not 
uniquely satisfied by the kind. Hence, strictly speaking, in the direct reference theory the only 
π
 And they remain so even after a new scientific theory has taken its place, the previous theories will remain as ways to 242
refer to the natural kind even if they have a false theory as their background. That is due to the indexical component on 
natural kind terms content, keeping track of those kinds no matter what.
 KRIPKE, 1980, p.60.243
 KRIPKE, 1980, p.140.244
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necessary a posteriori propositions that do not hold implicit metaphysical claims are maintained as 
the self-identity sentences exclusively. Therefore, such theoretical identities derive their necessary 
status from a matter of convention and not a metaphysical truth . If we follow Fine (1978b) in 245
identifying essentialism with individuals having distinctive necessary properties, necessity of 
identity is not really an essentialist thesis. 
 So, the ordinary person’s motivation to choose certain vocabulary can simply be because one 
way of speaking is related to a scientific theory while the other is not part of a coherent conceptual 
system . Since we can put it in terms of “the best conceptual scheme available” or “the best 246
theory”, the direct reference theory can be understood as neutral towards metaphysical issues and 
even analogous with proposals like Carnap’s that understand science and scientific language as 
conceptual schemes with no specific metaphysical background presupposed.  In this context, the 247
distinction between operational criteria and meaning is made. And science is directly related to the 
first of them due to scientific knowledge being influenced by the functionality of objects and kinds 
within human interests. And, as Putnam says, “without the illicit identification of meaning with 
operational criteria, it does not follow at all that meaning depends on the theory you accept” . 248
 Accordingly, Kripke’s and Putnam’s thought experiments only evidence the use of those 
terms as rigid designators. That is to say, they do not elucidate any metaphysical truth about objects 
and their essential properties. This result agrees with Putnam’s claim that “human intuition has no 
privileged access to metaphysical necessity” . Therefore, the metaphysical claims themselves must 249
be advocated separately. Our intuitions tell us about the use of language alone and that cannot be 
used as evidence of scientifically discovered properties like “molecule constituted by two hydrogen 
and one oxygen atoms” being a sufficient condition for being water. In order to single out a 
sufficient condition for being a certain object or kind we must have previously analyzed the concept 
of what the object or kind is - as Fine highlights. Also, remaining neutral relative to theoretical 
identities as it does, the direct reference is compatible with any metaphysical view, including Fine’s, 
 As a counterpart of the merely superficially contingent a priori knowledge as stated by EVANS, 1979.245
 PUTNAM, 1962.246
 Specially when we take into consideration statements like Putnam’s: “The distinction between statements necessary 247
relative to a body of knowledge and statements contingent relative to that body of knowledge is an important 
methodological distinction and should not be jettisoned. But the traditional philosophical distinction between statements 
necessary in some eternal sense and statements contingent in some eternal sense is not workable.” (PUTNAM, 1962, p.
670)
 PUTNAM, 1973a, p.206.248
 PUTNAM, 1973b, p.98.249
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that separates metaphysical from natural necessity. Whether the scientific discoveries constitute the 
essential properties of objects or kinds is a question only metaphysics alone can face. 
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